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1

Understanding Turkey’s Relations with Its Neighbors

Juliette Tolay and Ronald H. Linden

This is a book about Turkey—more specifically, Turkey’s relations with its immediate neighbors. Located center stage in a multiplayer international drama, Turkey’s “neighborhood” includes a remarkably diverse set of states, economies, and societies. There are former imperial territories and adversaries in the Balkans and the Middle East, new EU members along the Black Sea, and energy-rich post-Soviet states on the Caspian Sea. Given their past and present, these countries have a complex set of ties with Turkey, reflecting their politics and economics, their international postures, and their internal situations. Because of this region’s significance in contemporary geopolitical, economic, and cultural relations, Turkey’s acts toward the people and governments of this region also resonate with countries and organizations that are geographically more distant but still politically significant, like the United States and the EU. Therefore, this book about Turkey and its neighbors is also about Turkey and its transatlantic ties.

This book’s theme centers on Turkish foreign policy, especially the extraordinary changes in Turkish policy in recent years and the factors that might explain those changes. Turkey has gone from being a Cold War bulwark against communism and Soviet expansion, through a period of tentative exploration—and sometimes confrontation—with its neighbors, to a period of redefinition and often breathtaking activism. But while Turkish foreign policy is a good starting point for analysis, this book is, more broadly, about Turkish foreign relations. What states aim to do, what their policies promise, tells only part of the story, the part about the intentions of governments or leaders. The results of foreign policy steps, the reactions of target groups or states, constitute the other part. Foreign relations outcomes are often not the same as foreign policy intentions. Turkey has discovered, for example, that while it may be aiming to have “zero problems” with its neighbors (to use Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s phrase), the neighbors have something to say about whether that lofty goal is achieved. And internally, as leaders in democratizing states have discovered, foreign policy is policy and, as such, is subject to debate, discussion, and diversion by newly empowered domestic actors.¹
The authors of this volume aim to explore the complexities of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and the implications of changes in these relations for Turkey and for those who pay attention to Turkey. The contributors begin from the perspective that Turkey’s relations with its neighbors have changed dramatically in the last decade. But they recognize that the new activism is, in some part, based on developments in and perceptions of the recent (1990s) and more distant (Ottoman) past. The authors focus on Turkey’s externally oriented actions, generally referred to as “foreign policy,” but they appreciate the role that two-level games that is, domestic and international politics, might play in that policy. In fact, the authors consider mind a broad range of internal and external factors and actors that might lie behind changes in Turkish policy, including, for example, the role of energy needs, personalities and ideas, the economy, and the political structure, but their investigations do not privilege one set of factors or one explanatory approach.

Each chapter begins by recounting the nature of changes in Turkey’s recent actions toward a particular set of neighbors, for example, those near the Black Sea or in the Middle East, or a particular dynamic such as economic ties, migration, or democracy diffusion. Each then offers an argument that highlights the set of factors, domestic or external, human or national, that seem to offer the best explanation for why these changes have occurred.

Dramatic Changes in Turkey’s Foreign Relations

Turkey’s behavior in its neighborhood in the first decade of the new century stands in sharp contrast with that of the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey stood as a tough neighbor in a tough neighborhood, one that included two major zones of instability, the Balkans and the Middle East. On three occasions, Turkey came to the brink of war with one of its neighbors: Armenia in 1992, Greece in 1996, and Syria in 1998. Regular military incursions were launched into Northern Iraq; in the Aegean, continual tactical provocations between the Greek and Turkish air forces took place. Little effort was invested toward the resolution of the Cyprus issue, and at one point Turkey even threatened to annex the northern part of the island. Ties with post–Cold War Russia were tentative and burdened by a long history of tension and conflict. Relations with Iran were soured by the Kurdish conflict and political Islam. Turkey’s overall approach to its neighbors was characterized by confrontation, mistrust, and the use of threats and force. Yet, despite tensions over domestic issues such as Turkey’s human rights violations, widespread use of torture in prisons, and the rights of the Kurdish minority, Turkey remained a strong transatlantic partner.

The contrast with the current situation is striking. Relations with Greece have improved substantially since the beginning of rapprochement in 1999, and in 2004 the Turkish government reversed its position on Cyprus to support the Annan Plan for reunification. Turkey is now not only at peace with Syria, but
also is engaged in close political and economic cooperation with Damascus. A similar improvement of relations with Iraq culminated in the first-ever visit of a Turkish head of state to Baghdad in 2009 and the establishment of official relations with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. Turkey has also begun a process of reconciliation with Armenia aimed at reopening the border—closed since 1993—establishing full diplomatic relations, and jointly investigating historical events that burden contemporary relations. Gains from trade and recognition of common interests have substantially improved relations with both Iran and Russia. Turkey’s active foreign policy, which first aimed at improving bilateral relations and regional cooperation in the Balkans and among former Soviet states, has now been extended to the Middle East, the Gulf, and North Africa, as well.

This has not occurred without costs. One result of the Armenian overture, for example, has been a disruption of relations with Turkey’s “brother” Azerbaijan. And Turkey’s improved relations with Syria and Iran have been accompanied by sharply deteriorating relations with long-time ally Israel. The level of tension between Turkey and Israel, and to a lesser extent between Turkey and the United States, escalated in spring 2010 with the “Free Palestine” flotilla incident and Turkey’s vote in the UN Security Council against sanctions on Iran. The chilling of relations between Turkey and Israel and Ankara’s intensified political, economic, and cultural ties with Iran and some Arab states in the Middle East is a shift that has drawn much international attention.

Different Views on Changes in Turkish Policy

European and US observers with a long-standing interest and stake in Turkey are struggling to interpret these changes—and some are alarmed. One line of interpretation has been to see Turkey as “shifting East” and consequently as being “lost” by the West. In this view, Turkey has abandoned its traditional place in the Western camp in order to pursue trade and energy ties with Russia or with pariah states of the Middle East, Syria and Iran. This new Eastern orientation is read through the lenses of balancing and realigning strategic interests: that is, the creation of an “axis of the excluded” with Russia as a reaction against US policies or as an alternative to the European project. Beyond strategic considerations, cultural arguments are advanced, as well. Turkey under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) is seen as giving up on “becoming European” and reverting to its Asian or Muslim roots by reengaging its Middle Eastern neighbors. Some interpret the change of Turkish relations as the product of an illiberal drive within the Turkish political system at times linked with the Islamic character of the government. According to this view, Turkey feels more at ease with Muslim regimes, such as those in Iran and Syria, and undemocratic ones, such as Russia’s.

Other, more common, interpretations often apply simple but misleading metaphors. Turkey is seen as having evolved from a “barrier” to a “bridge” to
a “model.” After the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s position as a barrier protecting the West from Soviet expansion was recast as that of a bridge to Central Asia, the Caucasus and Caspian Sea, or the Middle East. In the 2000s, the bridge metaphor evolved into the idea of Turkey as a model or spearhead of Western liberal ideas and practices, especially in the Muslim world. All of these notions were based on a view of Turkey as an instrument, as part of a wider policy of engagement defined and implemented by other, more powerful, states. Turkey was a piece of someone else’s puzzle.

An alternative to such views is to understand Turkey’s new activism in its neighborhood and elsewhere as a product of Turkey’s own determination of its role as a regional power, one derived from its own perceptions, history, and political struggles. Turkey is in the process of redefining its identity and place, first of all in its own neighborhood, and is gaining self-confidence as it acts as a regional power. As part of this dynamic, some Turkish actions, such as its recognition of Kosovo, will be compatible with the desires of the Western powers, the United States and the EU; others, such as pursuing a vigorous relationship with Iran, will not. Turkey’s leaders see such complexities as normal and, moreover, as part of the multidimensional diplomacy that European powers often used when it suited their purposes. If Turkish policy is “Janus-faced,” it signifies Turkey’s engagement with both East and West, not an abandonment of its old allies. As Foreign Minister Davutoğlu put it, Turkey’s policies aim at being “complementary not in competition.”

All metaphors, like monocausal explanations, offer parsimony at the expense of some understanding. The challenge to the authors of this volume is to try to unpack the causes behind the changes that have occurred in Turkish foreign relations, while recognizing the inherent complexity of any dynamic involving humans and their states. This is all the more difficult given the variety of states, regions, and people with which Turkey is now engaged and the significance, in terms of broader world politics, of its actions. By virtue of its history and location, Turkey finds itself not only in the midst of many—and many conflictual—neighbors, but smack in the middle of several critical issues affecting states in its neighborhood, such as conflict in the Middle East and the Caucasus, and those beyond, such as energy provision, nuclear proliferation, human migration, the role of religion, and the diffusion of democracy.

The Approach of This Volume

Classic works on Turkish foreign policy, such as William Hale’s *Turkish Foreign Policy* and Philip Robins’s *Suits and Uniforms*, tend to be all-encompassing and typically focus on hard power. The current volume approaches the topic from a perspective that is more limited geographically but more expansive analytically. The aim is to offer a nuanced understanding of the changes in
Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. While those changes are set in the broader context discussed in other works and certainly intersect with EU-Turkey and US-Turkey relations, this volume’s focus is Turkey’s “neighborhood.” By this we mean the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.

The time frame of the book is contemporary, focusing on the recent transformation of Turkish foreign policy and its response to changes in its immediate neighborhood, globally and inside the country. Conceptually, the chapters in this volume are not enclosed within a single theoretical frame, either constructivist or realist, and they draw from different disciplines. In each chapter the authors look at state foreign policy and the political and economic factors underlying that policy. But all of the authors are also sensitive to the role of nonstate actors, a relatively new force in Turkish foreign relations.

To keep the task manageable, the authors have divided the map of Turkish foreign policy along geographic and thematic lines. Nathalie Tocci and Joshua Walker examine the Middle East in Chapter 3, and Ronald Linden, the Black Sea area in Chapter 4. It is a measure of the sea change in Turkish foreign relations that relations with Greece no longer dominate the policy or analytic focus. Thus, unlike virtually all other works on the subject, or books that deal primarily with Turkey-EU relations, our study of Turkey’s foreign relations includes no separate chapter on Greece. At the same time, to the extent that issues with Greece or those involving Cyprus affect the dimensions and regions treated here, they are included. Moving away from a geographic orientation, in Chapter 2 Walker also looks at the role of history—that is, the Ottoman idea in Turkish policy—while Kemal Kirişci explores the possible impact of the spread of ideas, including that of democracy, in Chapter 7. Policy areas such as energy, migration, and trade are studied by Ahmet Evin, Juliette Tolay, and Thomas Straubhaar, in Chapter 5, 6, and 8, respectively. Transatlantic relations are an important subtheme in all the chapters, but Nathalie Tocci takes a direct, comprehensive look at the implications of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy for ties with the United States and Europe in Chapter 9.

Possible Explanations of Change

External Factors

What are the factors that, at first glance, seem most likely to have an impact on Turkish foreign relations? At the international level, economic globalization has meant, for Turkey, an opening of the economy to the external world and greater economic interdependence. Turkey is now the seventeenth-largest economy in the world, and together its imports and exports exceed half of its GDP. Now more integrated with the global economy, the country needs to secure financial and investment flows and reliable sources of both goods and markets. Turkey is dependent on imports for two-thirds of its energy consumption; it needs to
send labor abroad and to host tourists in the country. Technological and informational globalization has also heightened Turkish awareness of what the world thinks of Turkey—and the world now pays closer attention to what is happening there. This means that sometimes international public opinion or international organizations may put pressure on the Turkish government for policy actions, for example, on minority rights. At the same time, the culturalization of international politics has contributed to global polarization. International conflicts are seen by some as stemming from a “clash of civilizations,” with the West and the Muslim world presented as hostile, mutually exclusive forces. Policies derived from this view, such as the war on terror, the securitization of migration, and democracy promotion, can have an important impact on Turkey’s ties with its neighborhood.

In a central geographic zone such as Turkey’s neighborhood, major international actors like the United States and the EU can have great influence. When the United States decides to project its power abroad, as it did in Iraq (1991 and 2003) and Afghanistan (2001), or involve itself in the competition over energy supplies (including those to Europe), its actions are likely to affect Turkey. The unexpected Turkish rejection of permission for the United States to invade Iraq from its territory in 2003 was a turning point in both US-Turkish and Turkish—Middle East relations. At the same time, the EU’s tortured consideration of Turkish membership has an impact not only on the evolving nature of Turkey’s self-definition and domestic politics but also on Turkey’s policies toward its neighbors, for example, by encouraging or discouraging ties in the Balkans or the Middle East. Turkey’s neighborhood also includes another assertive actor, one that is perhaps not a global superpower but certainly a neighborhood force. Russia’s own reformulated self-definition as a “sovereign democracy” with certain areas of “privileged interests” outside its territory was demonstrated most starkly by its intervention in Georgia in 2008. As a neighbor and Georgia’s largest investor and trading partner, Turkey could hardly pretend this was happening somewhere else. But with Russia as its largest trading partner and the major source of its energy supplies, Turkey was hardly in a position to challenge Moscow.

Overall, the broader Black Sea zone has become more central to many “external” powers as an important transit zone for energy. But the Russian invasion of Georgia, the EU’s failure to produce a common energy policy, and US pre-occupation elsewhere have left each Black Sea state, including Turkey, on its own. To its east and south, the Middle East has also witnessed important political developments right on Turkey’s border. These include the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq; a stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the fragmentation of the latter’s governing authority; Egypt’s waning leadership in the region; and the regional assertiveness of Iran. Turkey has venerable historic ties to these regions, but also growing contemporary cultural, economic, and political links; it is no longer cut off from or hostile to these developments. Instead, it is affected by them and, in some cases, deeply involved.
Domestic Factors

In combination with these changes in Turkey’s external environment, changes in the domestic political, economic, and societal spheres might also explain changes in Turkey’s behavior toward its neighbors. At the political level, the rise of the AKP and the strong political support it has enjoyed since 2002 are striking developments in a country more accustomed to unstable coalition governments. Structurally, Turkey has entered a period of virtually one-party dominance. The majority position of the AKP in parliament, the absence of an effective public or parliamentary opposition, AKP control of the presidency, and a weakening of the military institutionally and politically give the government substantial power to transform the country. Domestically, when membership in the EU seemed a reasonable prospect and support of liberal society was in place against an entrenched “deep state,” movement forward on democratization seemed assured. This made possible, for example, the political and legislative reforms required by the EU. From 2002 to 2005, Turkey adopted several harmonization packages to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, which led to a substantial democratization of the Turkish political system and the opening of formal accession negotiations in 2005. Since negotiations began, however, the pace of domestic reforms has slowed. Faced with waning public enthusiasm for joining the EU and an increase in nationalist sentiment, the AKP has since 2005 offered fewer major reform packages, and most of the ones that have been proposed, such as the “Kurdish opening” in 2009, have failed to materialize.22

More worrisome for observers—and political opponents—are the constitutional changes that serve to strengthen the power of the ruling government, even as they are made in response to broad EU urgings on democratization and reducing the power of the military.23 The secular establishment, embodied in the army and the judiciary, has at times challenged the AKP—so far unsuccessfully—resulting in a series of crises: over the election of Abdullah Gül as president of the republic in 2007, over the legal attempt to ban the AKP in 2008, and related to the government’s arrest in 2009 and 2010 of retired and active-duty military officers charged with plotting a coup. Attempts by the AKP to remove the ban on headscarves for women in public office or to change the composition of key judicial bodies, along with its pressure on opposition media, have caused worries at home and abroad about the direction of Turkish political development and have provoked polarization of the Turkish political system.24

The international implications of movement toward—and away from—greater democracy are multiple. For example, more open political dynamics in general means more involvement by societal actors in issues of foreign relations. Such actors come from the business world (professional associations, business associations) or are trade unions, NGOs, or think tanks. There are domestic lobbies, based either on ethnicity (e.g., Abkhazians) or ideology, such as nationalists opposed to normalizing relations with Armenia. Most broadly, perhaps for the first time in history, Turkish leaders are conscious of the effect of
foreign policy actions on public opinion and thus on their likely reelection prospects. Moreover, because of the rapid spread of information and the growing level of Turkish involvement in neighboring countries, what Turkey does at home does not stay at home. Migrants to and from Turkey, tourists, students, and even the producers of Turkish television shows have the potential to affect Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. At the same time, perceived Turkish backsliding on democracy at home can have international repercussions, such as when the EU weighed in on the possible ban of the AKP in 2008 or when the Kurdish party was banned in 2009.25

Political changes have occurred in parallel with important economic developments. After the opening of the Turkish economy to the world under Turgut Özal in the 1980s, growth combined with instability and high inflation during the 1990s. In 2001, following an economic crisis, Turkey engaged in a thorough reform of its financial infrastructure, which led to remarkable economic growth in the following years and allowed the country to be relatively protected from the recent global economic crisis. Turkey has become much more of a liberal market economy, and activity has shifted from traditional areas of dominance, such as agriculture, to manufacturing and services. There is a domestic geographic dimension to this shift, as well, whereby hubs of economic activity have diversified from Istanbul to include numerous central and eastern cities known as “Anatolian Tigers.” This has stimulated more interest in new markets abroad and allowed new economic actors with different backgrounds to have a stake in Turkish foreign economic (and political) relations.

Finally, any discussion of the internal context must take into account the possible impact of somewhat less tangible, but potentially equally important, factors. One is ideology, or, more properly, the role of ideas. The foreign policy vision of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, the prime minister’s first foreign policy adviser and then minister of foreign affairs, deserves prominent attention. His notion of a policy designed to ensure “strategic depth” for Turkey informs many of the actions of the country—even if they do not achieve the stated goals.26 Another potentially powerful factor involves identity: Turkey sees itself as—and has been—both a democracy and the heir of the Ottoman Empire. It is reasonable to expect that such self-perceptions will have some effect on its pattern of neighborhood foreign relations. Finally—and probably most difficult to establish empirically—there is the role of personality, in this case that of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Because he is the most prominent, and sometimes flamboyant, representative of the government, his personal demeanor, statements, and actions have great impact and must be considered as a possible factor in policymaking as well as policy implementation.

None of the authors of this book see Turkish foreign relations as the product of only one of these factors or even one set. Instead, they envision Turkey’s relations with its neighbors as a function of a particular mix of international and domestic environments and agents that together has produced Turkish activism in the country’s neighborhood.
Outline of the Book

Joshua Walker, in Chapter 2, analyzes how Turkey has been an outlier for most of its modern history as a Middle Eastern regional power, one that chose to turn away from its region and its past in favor of the West and Europe. Today, Walker argues, Turkey’s contemporary strategic decisions are very much informed by its Ottoman legacy, transmitted through the ideas, memories, and narratives of its political leaders. Given how central they are to the culture and identity of an imperial successor state like Turkey, imperial memories can, under certain conditions, be both causes and results of foreign policies.

In Chapter 3, Nathalie Tocci and Joshua Walker examine Turkey’s goals, positions, and policies toward the Middle East, including how Turkish mediation efforts are perceived in the region and what the overall impact of Turkish engagement has been. A particular focus is Turkey’s involvement with Syria, Iraq, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and Iran. The argument advanced in this chapter is that Turkey’s Middle Eastern policies can be explained by understanding both the changing international dynamics of the region and the domestic dynamics within the ruling AK Party.

Chapter 4 shifts the focus northward. In his analysis, Ronald Linden argues that Turkey’s relations with its Black Sea and Balkan neighbors are a product of both historical antecedents and plans for the future and reflect state-level actions, as well as societal ties, such as those of businessmen and ethnic lobbies. While domestic factors drive important parts of Turkey’s policy toward this region, powerful external actors, including the United States, the EU, and especially Russia, limit the range of Turkey’s power and produce some unintended outcomes, such as enabling an increase in the power of Russia.

Ahmet Evin, in Chapter 5, tackles the issue of energy in a volatile neighborhood. Turkish foreign policy faces enormous challenges in the Black Sea region, an arena of fierce global competition for resources and influence. Turkey’s involvement in the energy competition affects relations not only with Russia but also with states in the Caucasus, the Caspian basin, Iran, and Iraq, as well as the EU and the United States. Formulated early in the post-Soviet period, Turkey’s energy policy has pursued the dual goal of ensuring the country’s supply and developing Turkey into a regional energy hub. Evin points to the inherent contradictions among Turkey’s energy policy objectives, its ambition to become an independent regional power, its EU membership goals, and its transatlantic obligations.

In Chapter 6, Juliette Tolay analyzes the role played by migration in Turkish relations with its neighbors. Turkey has dramatically changed its policies toward migration, in particular on the issues of asylum, irregular migration, and visas. It is in the process of becoming a more rule-bound, less security-oriented, and, in most areas, more liberal country. Turkish migration policies have become part of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, Tolay argues, changes in the Turkish foreign policy environment at the end of the Cold War, as well as domestic
changes in the way foreign policy decisions are now made, explain the changes in Turkish migration policies. This, in turn, has led Turkey to be more fully, and humanely, connected with its neighborhood.

In Chapter 7, Kemal Kirişci looks at the expansion and impact of Turkey’s cultural, economic, and social relations with its neighborhood, focusing on its potential as a purveyor of democratization. The United States and the European Union played an important role in the democratization of Turkey and the emergence of a buoyant civil society in the last decade. More recently, Turkey—and, in particular, parts of Turkish civil society—has become a conduit for the transmission of ideas supporting democratization and the development of market economies. Kirişci argues that although Turkey does not have a democracy-promotion program resembling those of the United States and the EU, by default it supports the diffusion of democracy in its neighborhood. The fact that Turkish democracy is a “work in progress” in itself facilitates the diffusion process.

Chapter 8, by Thomas Straubhaar, presents an economic analysis of Turkey’s role in its neighborhood. Turkey’s economic relations with its neighbors have increased significantly in the past two decades but have remained relatively modest. In the near term, those relations cannot satisfy the needs of Turkey’s economy. The EU was and will be for the next decade the most important economic partner for Turkey. Given the political constraints on the membership process, Turkey will need a strategy that allows it to maximize the benefits of its ties with Europe, including improvement of the existing EU-Turkish Customs Union, and, economically, to “stay open to all directions.”

In Chapter 9, Nathalie Tocci explores the transatlantic implications of Turkey’s recent foreign policy transformation. Both the EU and the United States have dramatically altered the environment in which Turkish foreign relations unfold and have directly influenced the role Turkey plays as a foreign policy actor. At the same time, what Turkey has done in its neighborhood raises significant questions for the transatlantic alliance. For example, Is Turkish activism likely to be a benefit or a hindrance to US or European policy goals in the region? Does Turkish policy make a stable, peaceful, democratic peace more or less likely in the Middle East or the Black Sea? Do Turkish policies facilitate the growth of Russian power in the region? The answers are not necessarily self-evident. Ankara’s most important contribution may lie in precisely those areas where Turkish policies differ most from those of the EU and the United States—for example, its status as both “in and of” the region is a characteristic that transatlantic partners cannot duplicate.

In the conclusion, all the authors offer their most important finding or lesson from their aspect of the study and then turn their glances forward. Each briefly considers what the major international issues are likely to be for Turkey in the future and, more pointedly, what that will mean for those of us afflicted with a passion for trying to understand developments in this complex and fascinating country.
Notes

1. Kahler, *Liberalization and Foreign Policy*.
5. Hill and Taşpinar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?”
6. Çağaptay, *Turkey at a Crossroads*; Steinworth, “Disillusioned with Europe.”
7. Çağaptay, *Turkey at a Crossroads*.
8. Schenker, “A NATO Without Turkey.”
9. See Chapter 9 in this volume.
10. See Chapter 7 in this volume. See also Emerson and Tocci, “Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead”; Taşpinar, *An Uneven Fit?*
11. Kınıklioğlu, “Neo-Ottoman Turkey?”
12. Kalın, “Is the West Losing Turkey?”; Davutoğlu, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU.”
14. Ismael and Aydın, *Turkey’s Foreign Policy: New Perspectives on Turkey* “Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy”; *Turkish Studies*, “Special Issue: Turkey as a Transregional Actor.”
17. For works on the 1990s, see Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*; Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*; Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy*; Martin and Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*; Rubin and Kiriş, *Turkey in World Politics*.
18. For studies of Turkish foreign policy from a constructivist perspective, see Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*; Jorgensen and LaGro, *Turkey and the European Union*.
Understanding Turkey’s Relations with Its Neighbors—J. Tolay and R.H. Linden.
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