WHY BUSINESS SCHOOLS HAVE LOST THEIR WAY

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By Warren Bennis and Jim O’Toole

Business schools are on the wrong track. For many years, MBA programs enjoyed rising respectability in academia and prestige in the business world. Their admissions were ever-more selective; the pay packages of graduates ever-more dazzling. Today, however, MBA programs face intense criticism for failing to impart useful skills, failing to prepare leaders, failing to instill norms of ethical behavior--and even failing to lead graduates to good corporate jobs. These criticisms come not just from students, employers, and the media, but also from deans of some of America’s most prestigious business schools, including Dipak Jain at Northwestern University's top-ranked Kellogg School. One outspoken critic, McGill University professor Henry Mintzberg, says that the main culprit is a less-than-relevant MBA curriculum. In light of reform efforts already underway, many deans seem to agree with this charge. But genuine reform of the MBA curriculum remains elusive. We believe that is because the curriculum is the effect, not the cause, of what ails the modern business school.

The actual cause of today’s crisis in management education runs far deeper, and can be traced to a dramatic shift in the culture of business schools. Over the last decade or so, many leading business schools have quietly adopted an inappropriate and singular model of academic excellence. Instead of measuring themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their faculty understand important drivers of business performance, they measure themselves almost solely by the rigor of their scientific research. They have adopted a narrow model of science based on abstract financial and economic analysis and statistical multiple regressions. Some of the research

they produce is excellent but, because so much of it fails to reflect the way business actually works, the general result has been an ever-more crabbed focus of graduate business education, one that is decreasingly relevant to practitioners.

This "scientific model," as we call it, is predicated on the faulty assumption that business is an academic discipline like chemistry or physical anthropology. In fact, business is a profession, akin to medicine and the law, and business schools are professional schools--or should be. Like other professions, business calls upon the work of many academic disciplines. For medicine, those disciplines include biology, chemistry, psychology, and so on; for business, they include mathematics, economics, psychology, philosophy, and sociology, to name a few. The distinction between a profession and an academic discipline is crucial. In our view, no curricular reforms will work until the scientific model is replaced by a more appropriate one.

Before asking how business education should change, we need to examine how it got to this point. Most business schools claim a two-fold mission: to educate practitioners and to create knowledge through research. Historically, business schools over-emphasized the former at the expense of the latter. In fact, for the first half of the 20th century, most business schools were glorified trade schools. Professors were frequently good ole boys who dispensed war stories, cracker-barrel wisdom, and the occasional practical pointer. We remember when MIT’s Sloan School of Management was known as “Course XV, Industrial Management,” and its production class was taught by the manager of a nearby General Motors assembly plant. That was useful, but hardly professional, education.
Then in 1959, prompted at least in part by the enormous demand for professional managers in a booming post-war economy, both the Ford and Carnegie foundations issued devastating reports on the woeful state of business school research and theory. Both foundations recommended ways to give business schools respectable academic underpinnings and offered grant money toward achieving that end. Driven by the desire for reform and an availability of cash, top-tier universities began to treat their business schools almost as seriously as law schools. By the end of the 20th century, nearly all the nation’s “A-list” business schools--the two-dozen or so elite MBA-granting institutions and another dozen schools fighting to join the top tier—offered a curriculum of academic distinction. But in the process, their focus completely switched. Now the business of most b-schools is the creation of scientific research.

The Scientific Model

Virtually no top-ranked business school today would hire, let alone promote, a professor whose primary credential was managing an assembly plant, or even a software company, no matter how distinguished his or her performance. Elite b-schools aspire to the standards of academic excellence that the hard disciplines embrace—a phenomenon that S.R. Clegg and A. Ross-Smith have termed “physics envy.” In departments like physics and economics, top faculty members have few responsibilities other than to their disciplines: They are not required to train practitioners or to demonstrate practical uses of their research; they are free to do whatever research they choose and to produce subsequent generations of scholars even more focused than themselves. In this scientific model, the university exists primarily to support a scholar’s research. For the most part, universities accept this arrangement and the intellectual premise on which it rests, namely

that universities help society advance by supporting scientists who push back the boundaries of knowledge, leaving the practical implications to others.

It's much different in law and medical schools, where the outside world is explicitly involved. Law schools expect their faculty to be first-rate scholars, but they also value their ability to teach. Articles published in law reviews are cited in real trials. Medical schools do cutting-edge biological research, but most members of the teaching faculty are also practicing medical doctors. So why have business schools embraced the scientific model of physicists and economists rather than the professional model of doctors and lawyers? Although few b-school faculty would admit it, it may be because professors like it that way: It gives scientific respectability to the research they enjoy doing and eliminates the vocational stigma business school professors once bore. In short, the model advances the careers and satisfies the egos of the professoriate.

Business school professors using the scientific approach begin with reliable data about some subject which they use to test a hypothesis using regression analyses. Where data don't exist, professors set up simulations--hypothetical portfolios of R&D projects, for instance--to see how people behave in what amounts to a laboratory experiment. In some instances, those methods are useful, necessary, and enlightening. But they often fail to reflect the way business actually works.

When applied to what is essentially a human activity in which judgments are made with messy, incomplete, and incoherent data, statistical and methodological wizardry can blind without illuminating. Consider some of the most difficult questions facing managers: What impact does a culture of celebrity have on leadership? How should a CEO be compensated? How should global operations be designed to be effective
and equitable? What purposes does a corporation have beyond the creation of shareholder value? Such broad and multifaceted questions do not lend themselves to scientific experiment or validation.

Another consequence of the scientific model is that professors are evaluated based on the number of articles they publish in A-list business research journals. Submissions to these publications are refereed by anonymous panels of scholars who assess research findings based on objective, scientific standards. Those safeguards, de rigueur for discipline-based journals, help insure that research published passes strict scientific muster. Indeed, the system works fairly well in the “harder” business disciplines, such as economics and finance, that lend themselves to mathematical modeling. Even in finance, however, it creates pressure to publish articles on narrow subjects chiefly of interest to other scholars, not practitioners.

To be fair, some of what is published in A-journals is excellent, imaginative, and valuable. But much is not. A renowned CEO doubtless speaks for many when he labels academic publishing "a vast wasteland" from the point of view of business practitioners. In fact, relevance is often systematically expunged from these journals. We recently followed the process by which the results of a promising study of behavior among several thousand leaders in global corporations were reviewed at a leading management journal. The initial study showed that certain indicators of leadership misbehavior in companies could be monitored to identify ethical problems before a crisis occurs. Unfortunately, that finding could not be proved in a strictly scientific sense. As a result, the article that was finally published focused not on developing practical methods to reduce organizational risk but, instead, on questioning a minor detail in a previous study on a different subject.
The article was factual, but it was neither interesting nor useful. In their defense, scholars argue that the gradual accumulation of tiny and insignificant facts will one day accrete to a larger and general scientific understanding of organizational behavior. Meanwhile, practitioners who have to make real decisions must look elsewhere for guidance, notably to the business press and to the best-seller list—home to fewer and fewer books by faculty members.

Most issues that business leaders face are, in the final analysis, questions of judgment. What looks like a straightforward financial decision—say, to cut costs by relocating a service center—often has implications for marketing, sales, manufacturing, and morale that can’t be shoehorned into an equation. Strategic decisions, especially, are likely to go awry when based purely on quantitative factors. As author Dennis Smith notes, "Scientists…often assume that what they don't know isn't important." This is doubly true for social scientists who assume that variables not included in their equations are insignificant. In business research, the things that are routinely assumed away by academics on the grounds that they cannot be measured—most human factors and all matters relating to judgment, ethics, and morality—are exactly what make the difference between good and bad business decisions.

The fact is, leaders tend to get into deep trouble not by fouling-up the numbers but by failing to give the right weight to all the quantitative and non-quantitative factors that should figure in their decisions. The greatest risks they run are thus the by-products of their trained tendency to define problems in terms of what they know, and to fall back on past behavior when faced with a new challenge. In the 1970s, GM’s managers lost ground to the Japanese because they were so focused on applying tried and true industrial
engineering concepts to reducing costs that they failed to understand W. Edwards Demings’ insight that quality is a source of savings, not an added expense. In the 1980s, IBM nearly missed out on the personal computing revolution because its leaders saw the world only in terms of mainframes. In the 1990s, Kodak’s past success with chemical imaging kept its leadership from moving quickly enough into digital photography to save thousands of jobs.

The leaders of all of those companies did what they were most comfortable doing. That is not surprising. Most of us wear the concrete shoes of our earlier successes and know how to exploit our established strengths. But in a fast-changing global economy, managers cannot afford to react to every new problem with a conditioned reflex.

The singular model of scientific research is driving out all others, and as a result, business schools are institutionalizing their own irrelevance. We fear that this will be a difficult problem to correct because many business professors lack enough confidence in the legitimacy of their enterprise to define their own agenda. For example, business economics journals today are practically indistinguishable from traditional economics journals. And, not to be “out-scienced,” management researchers now focus on technical issues that have the look and feel of topics studied by their peers in the harder social sciences.

Business scholars could take a lesson from their colleagues in the discipline of psychology, which was stifling under the scientific model three or four decades ago. Then, the research was dominated by rigorous, but ultimately unproductive, studies of reaction time. As long as psychology professors labored in that small vineyard, they learned little that was of value to anyone. It was only after they began to apply their
imagination, and rigor, to much broader problems that psychology began to find answers to questions as various and vital as how power corrupts (Philip Zimbardo's "prison experiment" at Stanford) and how people make financial decisions (the Nobel Prize-winning work of Daniel Kahaneman and Amos Tversky). Not until respected psychologists dared to ask questions that mattered, whether or not they could be quantified in traditional ways, were these groundbreaking studies undertaken and did the field make enormous strides.

Unfortunately, most business school professors still limit their sights to what they can measure readily instead of searching for new ways to study what is important. In fact, management professors seem to have an almost morbid fear of being damned as popularizers. Can they believe that the regard of their peers is more important than studying what is really important to executives who can put their ideas into practice?

Who Makes Tenure?

This new focus on scientific research in business schools is, for the most part, unspoken. Indeed, most deans would deny it exists, claiming that their schools remain focused on practice, albeit with an increasing awareness of the value of rigorous research. Here we must watch what leaders do, not what they say. At A-list business schools, as well as at the wannabes that emulate their practices, the shift toward the centrality of scientific research is evidenced everywhere.

Just look at the hiring and tenure processes. Deans may say they want practitioner-oriented research, but they reward scientific research designed to please academics. By recruiting those who have high potential for being published in scientific
journals, they are creating faculties filled with individuals whose main professional aspiration is to devote themselves to scientific research. Today it is possible to find tenured professors of management who have never set foot inside a real business enterprise, except as a customer.

At many schools, the road to tenure does not run through "field work" in businesses. Among young academics and their advisers, this understanding is explicit. Junior scholars are urged to avoid too much work with practitioners and to concentrate their research on narrow, scientific subjects until late in their quest for tenure, or after. (While some, perhaps many, conscientious researchers take it upon themselves to learn about the practice of business after they are tenured, there are few incentives for them to do so.) To be sure, there is merit in suggesting that fledgling faculty try their wings before attempting arduous intellectual journeys, but b-school research is becoming too narrow even for some academics. One traditional factor in tenure decisions is how often the candidate’s work is cited by other scholars. Paradoxically, deans and tenure committees tell us that the number of citations is dramatically lower than it was a decade ago, evidence that their work doesn't matter even to their peers.

Even so, a management professor who publishes rigorously executed studies in the highly quantitative Administrative Sciences Quarterly is considered a star, while an academic whose articles appear in the accessible pages of a professional review--which is much more likely to influence business practices--risks being denied tenure. We know of no scholar at a first-rate b-school with a good publishing record who has been denied tenure or promotion for being a poor teacher, or being unable to teach effectively in executive education programs, where teachers must have real-world business experience.
But we do know a professor of finance who was denied promotion because his department decided he was not a “serious scholar.” The damning evidence against him included seven articles in this publication and the highest teaching ratings in his department. In short, the stated end of business education may remain the same, but the employed means make it impossible to achieve because rewards are directed elsewhere.

**The MBA Curriculum [or, What Gets Taught]**

What professors study, and how they study it, directly affects the education of MBAs and, through them, the way the nation’s largest businesses are managed. As research-oriented business professors come to dominate business school faculties, they assume responsibility for setting the MBA curriculum. Not surprisingly, they tend to teach what they know, which often translates into first-class instruction on methodology and scientifically oriented research. That is fine, as far as it goes, but these highly competent researchers are too often uncomfortable dealing with multidisciplinary issues in the classroom. They are ill-at-ease subjectively analyzing multi-faceted policy and strategic questions and cases that require judgment based on wisdom and experience in addition to--and sometimes opposed to--isolated facts. As a result, these messy issues, no matter how pressing, receive less attention in MBA courses. The trend away from using the case method is evidence of this point, a trend accelerated by greater emphasis on mathematical and quantitative skills in the revised Graduate Management Aptitude Test, the first filter of future managers.

If the purpose of graduate business education is to develop executives—leaders—then the faculty must have expertise in more than just fact collection. The best classroom
experiences are those in which professors with broad perspectives and bulging quivers of
technical challenges and then gradually peel away layers of cases to reveal hidden
strategic, economic, competitive, human, and political complexities, all of which must be
plumbed to arrive at truly effective business decisions. Graduates can each name great
practitioners of this style of business education; unfortunately, given the narrowing of the
intellectual paradigm over the last two decades, chances are that not one of them would
be hired, or tenured, at most top business school today. Columnist David Brooks laments
that “our universities operate too much like a guild system, throwing plenty of people
with dissertations at students, [but] not enough with practical knowledge. Why aren't
there more scholars who teach students to be generalists, to see great connections?”

In that regard, conditions at business schools have worsened dramatically over the
last two decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, albeit not at all institutions, business
schools were arguably the most intellectually exciting places in academia. In many
universities, b-schools were the primary loci of multi-disciplinary research. That
intellectual ferment and cross-pollination helped make business schools the hugely
popular institutions they are today. At one point, the faculty in our department at the USC
business school included individuals with advanced degrees in mathematics,
antropology, sociology, engineering, decision sciences, economics, and psychology. We
both served on recruitment committees that actively sought out scholars who were doing
innovative research and, at the same time, committed to making a difference in
organizations. These scholars published regularly, but few appeared in what today are
regarded as the “right” journals. Over the last 15 years, however, b-school hiring at USC
and almost everywhere else has focused on narrowly trained specialists, particularly those holding doctorates from other business schools. One unfortunate result of this approach has been that many business schools have had to hire adjunct professors to teach required MBA courses.

A few years back, the curriculum committee of our school considered a proposal for a multidisciplinary first-semester MBA course based on the current challenges of a well-known global corporation. The committee rejected the proposal—not because it was poorly designed or pedagogically flawed; in fact, the committee said it would be an advance over the existing program. The problem, in the words of one faculty member, was that “we are not qualified to teach it.”

The impact of this loss extends far beyond the classroom. Businesspeople are starting to sense that those in the academy are not engaged in the same profession they practice. Employers are noticing that freshly minted MBAs, even those from the best schools--in some cases, especially those from the best schools--do not have the skills their organization needs. At first, employers were confused about the source of this problem, but they seem to be realizing that the people who taught their new hires had spent little time in business organizations as managers or consultants, and that younger faculty members may not even know many businesspeople. Today, business practitioners are discovering that business professors know more about academic publishing than about the problems of the workplace. It’s no wonder there’s been such a marked increase in the number of in-house corporate universities and for-profit management education organizations. Or that companies like McKinsey have started hiring PhDs rather than MBAs, because the latter are good analyzers but poor generalizers.
Regaining Relevancy

In a 1929 address to the Harvard Business School, Alfred North Whitehead spoke these prophetic words:

Imagination is not to be divorced from the facts: It is a way of illuminating the facts. The tragedy of the world is that those who are imaginative have but slight experience, and those who have the experience have feeble imagination.

Whitehead’s words are today more fitting than ever. If business schools are to regain their relevance, they must come to grips with the fact that business management is not a scientific discipline but a profession, and they must deal with what a professional education requires. Harvard Business School professor Rakesh Khurana has pointed out that professions have at least four key elements, including an accepted body of knowledge, a system for certifying that individuals have mastered that body of knowledge before they are allowed to practice, a commitment to the public good, and an enforceable code of ethics. Professions thus are oriented toward practice and focused on client needs. Above all, professions integrate knowledge and practice. While we oppose making management a gated profession requiring credentialing and licensing, we nonetheless believe a useful step toward acknowledging that business is a profession would be to bring both imagination and experience back into business education. With an eye toward integrating knowledge and practice, Polaroid's Edwin Land suggested 50 years ago that every business school should run its own business. Why shouldn’t business schools operate the equivalent of medical school teaching hospitals? Cornell University’s Johnson School has recently responded to this long-ignored challenge by establishing the Cayuga MBA Fund LLC, run by students at the Parker Center for Investment Research.
By whatever means they choose, business school faculties simply must
rediscover the practice of business. While we cannot imagine a professor of surgery who
has never seen a patient, or a piano teacher who doesn’t play, today’s business schools are
packed with intelligent, highly skilled faculty who have no managerial experience. As a
result, they can’t identify the most important problems facing executives and don’t know
how to analyze the indirect and long-term implications of complex business decisions.
Hence they shortchange their students and, ultimately, society. That won’t change until
professors see they have a responsibility as much to educate professionals to make
practical decisions as they do to advance the state of scientific knowledge.

The strongest potential force for change is the business community, but
unfortunately, most corporate employers have been sending mixed signals. They
complain that the b-schools aren’t producing potential leaders but hire MBAs with
narrow specialties. Until the business community clearly articulates its needs, deans will
continue to respond to calls from the faculty for more of the same. In our view, business
leaders have not been demanding enough with the educational institutions purporting to
serve them. They have been unstinting in support of business schools, giving large sums
of money, typically without strings. This support is interpreted as a vote of confidence:
When a donor gives $30 million to put his name on the outside of a school, one can’t
blame the faculty for assuming he is pleased with what they are doing inside. Ironically,
then, the large contributions made to business schools over the last decade have been a
major force encouraging the trend away from serving the needs of the business
community.
If a study of the quality and utility of business education were undertaken by a prestigious organization like the Business Roundtable or the World Economic Forum, the findings would likely garner the level of attention among faculty and administrators generated by the 1959 Ford and Carnegie reports. While we don’t think it is healthy for corporate philanthropists to micromange the policies of educational institutions, in the case of professional schools, a critical governance role needs to be played by practitioners. The first step in this process is for corporate leaders to educate themselves about the current practices of the schools producing their future managers. They might start by picking up a copy of a prestigious A-list business journal and then asking themselves if the articles in it say anything their managers need to hear.

At the risk of sounding repetitive, let us be clear: We are not advocating a return to the bad old days when business schools were glorified trade schools. In every business, decision-making requires the amassing and analysis of objective facts and, thus, teaching quantitative skills must remain a prime function of b-schools. The challenge is to restore balance to the curriculum and among the faculty. The dirty little secret at most of today's best business schools is that they are serving the research interests and career goals of the faculty, with little regard for the needs of other stakeholders. Business schools don’t effectively address the practical and broad issues facing corporate leaders today because such issues aren’t on the faculty’s research agenda. Serving the needs of the business community by educating practitioners, and creating knowledge they can use, may exist as secondary functions at those business schools, but they are goals honored mainly in speeches made by deans seeking donations from corporate executives.
To balance the goals of faculty members with the needs of other constituencies, business schools must abandon the hard sciences as their model and look, instead, to their sister professional schools in medicine, dentistry, and law. Medical education is an apt model because it prepares students to deliver a highly skilled service and to manage hands-on enterprises. While research is critical, it plays a secondary role to the task of educating competent and ethical practitioners. Isn't that also the right balance for business education?

Business schools also might benefit from emulating the most innovative law schools. Like business, the law is a broad-based activity drawing upon many disciplines: economics, psychology, accounting, politics, philosophy, history, sociology, language, and literature, to cite a few. However, law schools have not succumbed to physics envy and the scientism it spawns. Instead, they tend to reward excellence in teaching and in writing that is actually useful to lawyers and judges. Research is an important component of legal practice and education, but most of it is applied, and its validity is not equated with the presence of a scientific patina. Law schools recognize that a well-written book, or well-documented article published in a serious, practitioner-oriented review is as valuable as a quantitative article published in a journal read only by cutting-edge researchers. That does not mean that scientific publications are not valued in law school performance evaluations: If a law school professor uses the scientific method to demonstrate that a commonly held belief is wrong, or to quantify an insight that is counterintuitive, that research is rewarded. When evaluating the work of law school faculty, questions asked include: “Is the research important?” “Is it useful?” “Is it interesting or original?” and “Is it well thought out, well-argued, and well-designed?” All
of these seem more appropriate as standards for evaluating the research of business school faculty than the narrowly defined standard of scientific rigor.

Of course, not all business schools suffer from the narrow focus we find so alarming. Deans and faculty at a few top-tier institutions are conscientiously struggling to find ways to do rigorous research without abandoning their professional missions.

Harvard Business School’s continued emphasis on case studies makes practitioners an integral part of the educational process. And Harvard helps insure that its curriculum will keep evolving by making course development a consideration in tenure and promotion decisions. Tom Campbell, Dean of the University of California’s Haas School of Business, has made a public commitment to teaching and research in the broader and softer areas of business that are the focus of his school’s influential--but un-refereed--California Management Review. Many second-tier b-schools, especially those not housed in large research-oriented universities, have also retained their professional focus.

(Unfortunately, the quality of education offered at some of those institutions suffers from the old affliction of trade-techitis). We are impressed with the University of Dallas’ recognition that an overly narrow approach to business education may have been a factor in the Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and Tyco scandals. As Thomas Lindsay, the university’s provost, explains:

Business education in this country is devoted overwhelmingly to technical training. This is ironic, because even before Enron, studies showed that executives that fail--financially as well as morally--rarely do so from a lack of expertise. Rather, they fail because they lack interpersonal skills and practical wisdom; what Aristotle called prudence.

Aristotle taught that genuine leadership consisted in the ability to identify and serve the common good. To do so requires more than technical training. It requires an education in moral reasoning, which must include history, philosophy, literature, theology and logic.
Lindsay estimates that, before the recent scandals, business students spent “95% of their time learning how to calculate with a view to maximizing wealth, but only 5% of their time developing their moral capabilities.” To right that balance, the Dallas business school introduced liberal studies into the curriculum and initiated a series of “intellectual and moral exercises.”

Traditionally, business schools have lacked offerings in the humanities. We believe that is a serious shortcoming. As teachers of leadership, we doubt that this topic can be understood properly without solid grounding in the humanities. Leadership requires an understanding of the human condition, the central theme of the world's greatest literature. When the hard-nosed behavioral scientist, Jim March, taught his famous course at Stanford using *War and Peace* and other novels as texts, he emphatically wasn’t teaching a literature course. He was drawing on works of imaginative literature to exemplify and explain the behavior of people in business organizations in a way that was richer and more realistic than any journal article or textbook could provide. Similarly, when executives read excerpts from the classics of political economy and philosophy in seminars at the Aspen Institute, the intent is not to turn them into experts on Plato and Locke but to illuminate the profound recesses of leadership that scientifically oriented texts overlook or oversimplify.

Reforming business education means more than simply adding courses in the humanities. The entire MBA curriculum must be infused with multidisciplinary, practical, and ethical questions and analyses reflecting the tangled challenges business leaders face. In revising the MBA curricula, we emphatically do not advocate that
business schools abandon science. Rather, they should encourage and reward science that illuminates the mysteries and ambiguities of today’s business practices. Oddly, for all the emphasis business schools put on science, they do little in the one area of contemporary science that probably holds the greatest promise for business education: cognitive science and neuroscience. There, pioneering scientists are using functional magnetic resonance imaging technology to study how the brain behaves while making economic decisions, including gender differences and the role of trust.

The problem is not that business schools have embraced scientific rigor but that they have forsaken other ways of knowing. It isn’t a case of either/or. Manifestly, there are business professors who do research contributing to both science and practice. And not every professor need be such a skilled switch hitter. In practice, business schools need a variety of professors with different skills and interests which, collectively, cover territory as broad and as deep as the challenges business managers face. As the late Sumantra Goshal wrote, citing Clegg and Ross-Smith, in a probing analysis of the problems with management education today: “the task is not one of delegitimizing existing research approaches, but one of relegitimizing pluralism.”

Rebalancing runs against the perceived self-interest of many faculty, not to mention the seemingly unstoppable trend in academia toward specialization. We believe the most effective levers for overcoming this resistance are personnel policies related to recruitment, promotion, tenure, and other academic rewards. Instead of blindly following the paths forged by trade schools or traditional academic departments, business schools must create their own unique standards of excellence. However, many business school leaders now say their universities are forcing them to adopt the same standards for hiring
and promotion used by graduate departments in the hard sciences. In our view, this is often an excuse for maintaining a dysfunctional (but comfortable) system. Law schools and schools of music, dentistry, pharmacy, and fine arts have all carved out standards that are appropriate for their various professions, and now business schools must have the courage to do the same.
As students make their way through the first year, they run into that great fount of established wisdom: seniors. They rapidly pick up tips on what kind of jobs pay best, the general irrelevance of scientific and technical material, how to traverse the academic system with minimal effort and the importance of participating in all kinds of personality development activities (the crowning glory being a "student festival" manager). The "greed is good" mantra that students pick up while dreaming about pay packages also comes loaded with "legendary" tales about how an alumnus made so much money in