The Road Ahead
Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq

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with the war in Iraq has come the responsibility to win the peace. In military campaigns, enormous resources may be marshaled at a moment’s notice, including professionally trained soldiers supported by the latest technology and an intricate and elaborate global infrastructure specifically designed to fight and win wars. There is no analogous infrastructure or clarity of mission for contending with the aftermath of war. Indeed, the U.S. approach to postconflict reconstruction abroad is low-tech, inconsistent, improvised, and too often undone by a preoccupation with domestic politics and an instinctual aversion to nation building. “We have done our part,” military commanders are heard to say to aid workers and other postconflict professionals. “Now you do yours.” Despite soaring rhetoric committing the United States as strongly to postwar peacebuilding as to military intervention, the track record of U.S. follow-through is disappointing.

The inadequacy of postwar interventions does not necessarily result from a lack of expertise. Much has been learned from previous postconflict engagements about what is required to get the job done in such environments. What has been missing is not knowledge but perceived self-interest, political will, and an adequate attention span—elements of commitment that will mark or frustrate success in postwar Iraq. Military occupation of a defeated foe is more complex and far more difficult than the commitments that have so tested the United States in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti. Is the United States prepared to stay the course to secure, govern, rebuild, and democratize war-torn Iraq?

The United States has fundamentally reshaped its doctrine of military engagement without similarly reforming its commitment and capacity to stabilize and transform postconflict environments. In this dissonance between an overdeveloped ability to wage and win war and an anemic facility for winning peace is the potential for a reversal of war gains, a subverting of the country’s long-term security goals, and a deflating of ambitions to reform the norms of international order and recast the U.S. role in the world. Losing a peace in Iraq could damage the image and reputation of the United States for years to come and make it more difficult for the United States to leverage its unprecedented power in the future. The United States must carefully consider what it takes to get the job done, brace for the unexpected, and go the distance in postconflict Iraq, mindful of its successes and failures in such endeavors in the past.

The last military occupations of comparable scope and complexity were the post–World War II military governments in Germany and Japan. The ongoing postwar intervention in Afghanistan demonstrates the latest postwar engagement in an environment that most resembles what the United States may encounter in Iraq. Afghanistan is an Islamic nation fractured by factional violence and riddled with insecurity and crime while playing host to a simultaneous hot war on terror and a postwar reconstruction
effort. Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan offer several positive and negative lessons on appropriate policy and behavior during a period of military governance in Iraq.

1. In the immediate postwar period, security and rule of law are essential to the success of humanitarian and reconstruction initiatives as well as political reform. It is not sufficient to separate and contain warring factions—security that counts also requires a constabulary capacity, civilian policing, and the ability to arrest, detain, and try offenders in a fair manner.

2. Recognize the political implications of each decision, minimize arrogance, and avoid the establishment of a postwar caste system. Inconsistencies between U.S. democratization rhetoric and U.S. support for factional proxies have undermined U.S. credibility in Afghanistan. The incongruence between rhetoric and action in both post-World War II occupations carried consequences in each instance. Attitudes of superiority, informal caste systems, and perceived disparity between words and behavior may prove disastrous in Iraq, where every move will carry political significance and where international legitimacy for occupation is in short supply.

3. Avoid demonstrating suspicion of all Iraqis, while isolating and defining Ba'athists and other Saddam loyalists as a criminal class who have betrayed the trust of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists are widely regarded as criminals, not as national benefactors. Treating all Iraqis as collectively guilty of the regime's crimes not only would be inappropriate but also would confirm suspicions about U.S. ethnocentrism and imperial ambition. The United States should instead expand civil liberties, promote public participation in political decision making and community affairs, and purge Ba'athists from high-ranking civil and military positions. Such an approach will help to make popular forces less likely to undermine assistance initiatives and more likely to embrace reconstruction and to recognize that reform will be a long-term process.

4. Near-term participatory “peace dividend” reconstruction initiatives will prove beneficial in managing rising expectations, avoiding dependency, contributing to pluralism, and drawing public support away from possible spoilers. In Iraq, large, highly visible projects to repair transportation, water, health, and telecommunications systems will certainly be necessary; however, the United States must also not neglect the contributions that can be made by Iraq's social capital (its indigenous capacities) not only to large-scale projects but also to smaller, community-based relief and reconstruction endeavors.

5. During the very first weeks of postconflict operations establish clear policies for civil-military interaction regarding relief and development initiatives. The distribution of humanitarian aid and the implementation of development projects will occur simultaneously during the first weeks of postconflict operations. Such tasks call for significant civil-military interaction, which in turn requires clear policies to ensure that U.S. military contingents and nongovernmental organizations understand each other's role and can collaborate effectively. Too often, policies are unclear or fashioned on the spot, creating confusion and mutual hostility between the military and the NGOs. If the military and NGOs, as well as the Iraqi people, are not to lose valu-
able time and important opportunities, guidelines for civil-military interaction must be clearly established early on.

6. Form national advisory bodies composed of Iraqis not associated with the past regime at the earliest possible moment. These bodies should be succeeded by a variety of supervised participatory selection processes at local and regional levels to choose delegates to a broadly representative national transitional council—a council that will be advisory in its first months but will slowly assume greater responsibility.

7. Do not underestimate the needs, challenges, and time required for postconflict reconstruction and nation building. The United States should brace for a long-term commitment in Iraq—perhaps even longer than the seven years required for the occupations in Japan and Germany. The anticipated six-month commitment currently being described by Pentagon planners will be too short a period to consolidate the most volatile threats to the peace process and to return significant accountable governing authority to Iraqi institutions.

8. Ensure the prompt and thorough political decontamination and de-Ba’athification of Iraq. The processes of purging the military and purging civilian institutions often proceed differently, with clear lines of authority and command responsibility often making it easier to remove military officers than to purge their civilian counterparts. In addition, there are differences between “vetting in” individuals (judging them clean enough to take up their duties) and “vetting out” individuals (dismissing or charging them with crimes or activities unbecoming to their position). Typically, a deep process of vetting out occurs first and is best performed with speed. Personnel, intelligence, and military service files—once they have been interpreted and evaluated—are invaluable to the vetting process. What remains of these files should be secured without delay.

Success in postwar Iraq may be even more difficult to achieve than winning the peace in Germany and Japan proved to be—and the attempt will certainly be far more complicated than the limited U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. The German and Japanese occupations came at the end of long wars with large numbers of troops and a considerable logistics capacity deployed across the theater and available to pivot toward postwar initiatives. There was ample planning and legitimacy, and little anti-Americanism or regional instability to be concerned with. The United States had prevailed in a global war and was not, as it is today, in a continuing “war on terror” with an indeterminate foe. The country was not in a fishbowl surrounded by nations and cultures eager to find fault with its actions. Domestically, Americans who had sacrificed in the war years saw the occupations as the obligatory closure of a terrible but necessary episode. U.S. intentions were rarely questioned at home or abroad.

In Iraq, the United States will be held to unfamiliar standards in difficult circumstances. Is the United States ready? Postwar interventions in Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan offer examples of occupation environments and the character of commitment that postconflict environments routinely require.
Military planners have demonstrated that rapid deployment of special operations personnel and judicious use of traditional military assets designed to contend with every reasonable contingency are appropriate for modern wars with countries such as Iraq. A similar doctrine is also appropriate in the wake of such wars, especially during the critical eighteen-month window that begins with the first day of the peace, when postwar environments are most vulnerable to instability and a relapse into violence. In Iraq, well-planned, flexible, and effective postwar initiatives will stabilize the country, empower Iraqi moderates, and help the United States to contain tensions and influence political developments in the region and around the world. Conversely, half measures and limited endurance may lead to the collapse of the Iraqi state, the eventual rise of another despot, or crippling economic uncertainty with global implications. The stakes are extraordinarily high in the Middle East as Washington seeks to use unprecedented U.S. power to redefine the organizing principles of international order.

The complexity of simultaneously managing threats to security, political and economic postwar transitions, humanitarian crises, and daunting reconstruction tasks among traumatized and exhausted populations is consistently underestimated. Current planning, taking into account the discrepancies between State Department and Pentagon timelines, foresees a six- to twelve-month military occupation as necessary to restore order, contain humanitarian crises, rebuild the economy, and create conditions necessary for democracy in Iraq. The lessons of history, from the post–World War II military occupations of Japan and Germany to the current engagement in Afghanistan, suggest this is overly optimistic. Self-sustaining peace and stability are still years away in Afghanistan. The German and Japanese occupations were thought necessary for several months at most. Each lasted seven years.

The post–World War II military occupations and the continuing intervention in Afghanistan illustrate particularly relevant lessons for consolidation of the peace in Iraq. The United States entered Germany on September 11, 1944, with military governance units following on the heels of combat troops. By May 1945, Allied occupation of German territory was complete. Within days of full occupation, U.S. civil affairs units sent detachments into every town, establishing security and U.S. authority in each population center within the U.S. sector. Within weeks, denazification, control of displaced and refugee populations, protection of records and files, restoration of local governance institutions, and administration of the day-to-day affairs of the population began to consume and challenge U.S. forces, despite over two years of preparation for just such eventualities.

Much the same occurred in Japan. U.S forces began entering Japan just days after Emperor Hirohito surrendered, on August 15, 1945. Within weeks, General Douglas
MacArthur established his command in Tokyo and began an astonishing round of reforms. He too sent troops and civil affairs officers on rounds of motorcycle diplomacy throughout the country to establish security and to explain U.S. intentions while managing local expectations of the military government. In both occupations, combat troops rapidly transitioned into a governance presence. Soldiers were issued handbooks detailing the rules of engagement with local populations as well as appropriate responses to administrative dilemmas, the structure of local governance institutions, methods to disarm local police, and the manner in which civil disturbances should be settled. But U.S. military commands in occupied Germany and Japan were consistently staggered by the enormity of the challenges in the war-to-peace transition and were tested from day one by the unexpected. Despite long years of preparation to occupy a defeated foe, domestic support for occupation, and high international legitimacy for military governance of Germany and Japan, winning the peace proved far more difficult than Washington had originally envisioned.

Afghanistan reflects the degree to which military doctrine has changed from the post–World War II era. U.S. military personnel now spend even more time refining their war-fighting skills and even less learning how to work with civilians and civilian institutions. Nation building and commitment to long-term peace operations have become politically expedient. Proxyism coupled with limited engagements constrained by the exigencies of domestic politics has contributed to schizophrenic engagements in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, a security gap and military factionalism undermine reform and consolidation of the peace. Moreover, the attention-deficit disorder of donor countries, exemplified by the United States, promises to short-circuit peacebuilding while undermining citizens' trust in the surety of a better future.

U.S. experience in postwar Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan demonstrates success, failure, and the hard lessons learned in the course of contending with complex emergencies, postwar reconstruction, international opinion, domestic political imperatives, and indigenous capacities for change. The following sections consider the serious challenges confronting postwar reconstruction in Iraq, examine the U.S. engagements in postwar Germany and Japan and in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, and ask what these three cases can tell us about how the United States might best contend with the aftermath of the war against Iraq. A synopsis of these lessons concludes the report.
The Costs of Failing to Win the Peace in Postwar Iraq

The challenges in postwar Iraq will be formidable. Iraq is not a failed state nor is it experiencing significant civil war, but both may result from a shorthand approach to postwar reconstruction, a doctrine of limited military engagement, and poor anticipation of postconflict security requirements. Iraq is a sophisticated country, not a struggling developing nation on the brink of disintegration. The country’s infrastructure, though already worn from neglect and additionally damaged by war, remains serviceable. Natural resources, arable land, a sophisticated diaspora, and the educational level of Iraqis are important national assets. More than 70 percent of the population lives in or near cities, where the culture is predominantly secular and distinctly urban.

Yet the structural integrity of the nation under Saddam Hussein has depended on fear, violence, illicit oil revenue, and the illegitimate authority of single-party politics. If the United States is not prepared to act decisively in the first weeks of occupation and over the next several years, uncertainty will rapidly fill the space created as the architecture of the Ba’ath Party’s authority is dismantled. There will be constant pressures toward political fragmentation and social division. Challenges to U.S. authority will continue. If this disorder develops into large-scale violence and is combined with the brutal lethality of modern weapons, the result may be one of the toughest political and humanitarian crises to date.

A postwar scenario in Iraq may include loyalists of Saddam Hussein or looters damaging critical intelligence, property, and police files as well as important elements of the national infrastructure. Shiites, Kurds, Assyrians, and Chaldeans, persecuted religious and ethnic groups that make up more than 80 percent of the population of Iraq, may seize important facilities and territory. Kurds in particular may attempt to formalize their independence in formal and informal ways, despite the best efforts of U.S. representatives to curtail their ambition. Kirkuk may remain a flashpoint requiring a heavy security presence to prevent Kurds from exercising unilateral control over the city, to settle inevitable property disputes, and to calm Turkish fears over Kurdish intentions to revive dormant passion for a unified, cross-border Kurdish state. A desire for political change, uncertainty over U.S. intentions, unleashed postwar expectations, and Hussein’s retribalization of Iraqi society may all contribute to a situation in which local support for factional leaders constantly shifts, like a weather vane in variable winds, as the military fortunes and political reputations of those leaders fluctuate.

No faction in Iraq, including the remnants of the Sunni-dominated military, is likely to be strong enough to establish complete control over the country. Without an external presence able to impose at least temporary order in the postwar power vacuum, violent political competition will be inevitable. Iraq’s critical social capital will require continued protection as well. Iraqi technocrats and their families, many of whom are Ba’ath Party members of convenience, may have
fled, disappeared, or attempted—with varying levels of success—to renounce their ties to the party. Already strained basic utilities, transportation, and communications infrastructure, some further damaged by the war, may become unreliable, and local governance and what rule of law that exists will likely deteriorate. In such conditions, potential political moderates, important to a return of sovereignty, would be marginalized and the trust, participation, and sense of hope that are essential for legitimate governance would be overwhelmed. Without providing visible support for pluralism or protection of basic human rights as Iraq transitions from war to peace, the United States would be more vulnerable to charges of imperial intent and geostrategic subterfuge and would lose the credibility necessary to encourage reforms elsewhere in the Islamic world. Distrust of the United States among those who might someday legitimately rule Iraq will intensify. Strongman policies of the past would continue, complicating the U.S. exit strategy and eroding the security environment necessary for development to occur.

As during the war, so thereafter, every action the United States takes will be profoundly political, with operations from the first day of the peace occurring in a fishbowl. The United States will be held responsible for political emergencies, humanitarian crises, factional fighting, and any general breakdown in order from the moment the U.S.-led coalition assumes power.

These are the kinds of postwar contingencies that should be anticipated with as much vigor as is commonplace in the conduct of war. What is clear from experience in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and Somalia is that winning the peace is never certain and a very difficult thing to do. As Anthony Cordesman writes in his report Lessons of Afghanistan, “Even the most impressive tactical or strategic military victory can lose much or all of its meaning if it is followed by a diplomatic and political power vacuum.”

Doubtless the postwar scenario described here does not account for every uncertainty that may emerge in Iraq. But with the costs of failing to win the peace so high, it is reasonable to assume—based on experience—that successful postwar reconstruction will not be easy or predictable.
Three

Totalitarian Liberals, Top-Down Revolution, and a Work in Progress

The Occupation of Germany

General Lucius Clay, the U.S. viceroy in postwar Germany, was an engineer by training and also an expert at reconstruction. His military experience consisted of assignments with the Army Corps of Engineers during the New Deal and as the army's chief of matériel during World War II. Clay was chosen under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to take charge of the U.S. sector in southern occupied Germany. To the north lay the Soviet zone. To the west and northwest lay the French and British sectors. Clay ultimately assumed his post under the new president, Harry S. Truman.

Michael Beschloss's book *The Conquerors* describes how Clay was constrained in carrying out his mission by Washington's micromanagement and by JCS 1067, the blueprint for U.S. occupation that limited the kinds of assistance available to postwar Germany. This directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was punitive and restrictive, reflecting the belief that Germans bore collective guilt for the war and that stark recognition of the consequences of their actions would cure the militarism that had led German citizens to engage in two successive conflicts. Clay was able to use his expertise to restore public utilities, clear roads, and move rations and supplies to prevent starvation and disease, but he was prohibited from providing economic or reconstruction assistance of any kind.2

Instead, Clay was to reestablish the basic necessities of life, prevent sabotage of important facilities, and ensure that war production capacities were demolished. Above all, Clay was to preside over the denazification of the German psyche. Nazi influence in the press, business affairs, financial institutions, and schools was to be eliminated. Textbooks were revised, business and financial cartels dismantled, and reparations extracted from what remained of the German economy. Nazi Party members were removed down to the local level, while military, intelligence, and propaganda organizations and those associations dedicated to nationalist causes and remembering war dead were dissolved. In all, more than three million Germans would be charged with a variety of offenses for their wartime actions and affiliations out of a total of thirteen million Germans who were reviewed in the U.S. sector.3

Beschloss notes that Clay was careful to understand the dominant sympathies of the time. Talk of reconstruction in Germany in the years immediately following the war threatened the careers of even the most decorated brass. In late 1945, General George Patton, governor of the province of Bavaria, remarked to the press that “more than half the German people were Nazis and we would be in a hell of a fix if we removed all Nazi party members from office.” The resulting row back in Washington forced Eisenhower to relieve him.4

There was similar enthusiasm in Washington and among occupation government staff to remind Germans of their defeat and second-class status. Outside the Grand Hotel in
Nuremberg, in the heart of the U.S. sector, a sign announced that the building was for the exclusive use of U.S. military personnel and that entry was forbidden to “Germans, dogs and displaced persons.” “Anyone violating the above,” it was written, “will be booked by the Military Police for proper disciplinary action.”

In 1949, newspaper correspondent Freda Utley worried that the military government’s directives and the seduction of young Americans by excesses of power and status they would never dream of possessing back home would nazify the occupation government. She labeled many of Clay’s staff “totalitarian liberals” and scorned the incompatibility of liberation rhetoric with Jim Crow practices and the caste system she observed. Germans accused military government personnel of exhibiting the same “master race” attitudes that the United States was there to eliminate from German consciousness. “We expected Russian lawlessness,” Germans told Utley, “and we knew what to expect from the British who aim to eliminate Germany as a competitor, but we once believed the Americans were different.”

Despite this treatment of Germans and the widespread perception by State Department experts that German citizens were incapable of democracy, Clay was charged with imbuing the public with an appreciation of U.S.-style governance. He appointed three local Germans as regional administrators in the U.S. sector before British, French, or Soviet commands thought to do so. The appointed Germans were “clean,” never having been in the Nazi Party or accused of other criminal activity. Clay asked these administrative advisors to assist him in drafting a variety of policy documents for his review and to help him fashion cadres of untainted lower-level German functionaries to counsel their U.S. military superiors. With the advice of these Germans, Clay and his deputies created, among other things, the Ministry for Political Liberation to oversee the work of quasi-judicial bodies staffed by handpicked Germans entrusted to try lower-level war crimes suspects. Clay also counted on advice from these “clean” Germans as he ordered his regional commanders to disband and then reestablish police forces employing Germans who had never been in the Nazi Party. These quasi courts, incipient local administrations, and police forces modeled on local control and decentralized power formed the basis for the development of these institutions for decades to come.

During the winter of 1945–46, Clay grew increasingly concerned about the growing influence of the Soviets. “There is no choice,” Clay often repeated, “between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories.” Clay exploited a loophole in JCS 1067 to increase daily humanitarian rations to 1,500 calories per day. He warned Washington that without additional assistance, growing food shortages and economic misery would pave the way to a communist Germany. Clay’s appeal, economic stagnation in Europe, and sluggish recovery on the Continent prompted Washington to reevaluate the punitive style of the first months of occupation and to reconsider doubts over whether Germans were able to meaningfully participate in the management of their own affairs.

Still, a change in occupation policy was slow in coming. By May 1946, the German economy had deteriorated further and Clay feared the worst for the coming winter. Each sector in postwar Germany was governed by a separate occupation government, each managing its own affairs and rarely coordinating economic or political initiatives with the
others. The entire country was still dependent on large amounts of humanitarian aid, and little was being done to begin local production of basic necessities or to otherwise alleviate the need for continuous injections of emergency aid. The rest of Europe, previously dependent on the industrial base of prewar Germany, continued its listless recovery. This vulnerability of Europe, the destitution of the German public, and continued concern over Soviet intentions moved the Joint Chiefs of Staff to join Clay in lobbying Truman to change course.

By winter, Truman had sacked Secretary of State James Byrnes, replacing him with General George Marshall. By the summer of 1947, Marshall had successfully made the argument that JCS 1067 must be rescinded on “national security grounds” and replaced by JCS 1779. Drawing on earlier memos from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Marshall pushed aside concerns over denazification and punitive reminders of defeat. The Marshall Plan saw the reconstruction of Germany and Europe in geostrategic terms, a strong viable German economy and democracy being necessary not only for enhanced security against the Soviets but also for the eventual exit of occupation troops. The course correction had taken nearly two years to determine, but it was dramatic once it began.

Under JCS 1779, Clay would eventually rehabilitate more than 90 percent of Germans purged under JCS 1067. He further increased food rations and began to actively dismantle the most egregious elements of the two-class system so visible in earlier years. Common concerns about security and the need to reconstruct the German industrial areas of the Ruhr and Rhineland for Europe’s benefit moved the French, British, and U.S. sectors to combine into one entity. Together they unified currency and license plates, defined a flag, produced identity documentation, and restored local governments. The unification of the Allied sectors and the visible commitment to reconstruction cheered Germans, as did what were widely regarded as heroic measures to deliver aid to Berlin during the June 1948 Soviet blockade of the city. For many Germans, this commitment to reform was a long-awaited congruence of rhetoric, expectations, and behavior. Rapid improvement in the standard of living in the Allied sectors accelerated progress toward political goals.

In May 1949, Konrad Adenauer worked with Allied military personnel to draft the Basic Law, the equivalent of a constitution for what would become the Federal Republic of Germany. Avoiding the word “constitution” in order not to condone the division of the German state between east and west, the Basic Law was approved by the new combined Allied military council and was distributed among nascent indigenous institutions created with the cautious introduction of democracy. No indigenous German political body existed to ratify, alter, or rubberstamp the document. The Basic Law called for loose federalism among small, semiautonomous lands as well as checks and balances, with significant limits on executive power. Important elections followed, supervised and managed by occupation forces whose numbers would dwindle until 1955.10

The Occupation of Japan

In October 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Associated Press that “the United States is considering a model for post-war Iraq that resembles Japan after World War II, when Japan was occupied by an American-led government.” Earlier, David Sanger and Eric Schmitt of the New York Times reported that an occupation plan for Iraq would be
modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, with General Tommy R. Franks heading up a U.S. military government in Baghdad. Franks, they wrote, would assume the role that General Douglas MacArthur served in Japan after its surrender in 1945. While Powell has subsequently backed off from comparisons of a postwar Iraq with the occupation of Japan, Franks and Lt.-Gen. Jay Garner (Ret.) have been chosen to head an occupation government in Iraq. The temporary government assembling in Baghdad will be the largest American occupation force since the United States assumed postwar governance of Japan nearly sixty years ago.

The Potsdam Declaration, the “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan,” and the classified JCS 1380/15 provided theme and direction to the occupation government in Japan. Potsdam was tough but still less vindictive than JCS 1067. It described how stern justice, reparations, and demilitarization were necessary along with the removal of obstacles to democratization. It was also ambiguous enough to leave the emperor’s role and fate undefined. The “Initial Post-Surrender Policy” went further. It gave MacArthur authority over media as well as educational and social policy in order to politically reorient the country. The sensitive JCS 1380/15 described how MacArthur was to avoid a policy of collective punishment and instead to use his authority to drive what John W. Dower in Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II calls a “wedge” between the militarists on the one side and the public and the emperor on the other.11

The occupation government in Japan was to instill an appreciation of democratic practice from its earliest days. Within his first weeks in Japan, MacArthur ordered and then delivered on an impressive array of reforms, including the dismantling of large family-run conglomerates, land redistribution, and the introduction of civil liberties protections. Labor was given the right to organize and strike. Freedom of speech and assembly were announced. Women were given the right to vote and political prisoners were released from jails. The government-sanctioned religious cult of Shinto was banned. School curricula were revised and the media and the arts were censored to promote pacifist values even while occupation personnel stressed the importance of a free press. Simultaneously, the occupation government purged well-known militarists and wartime collaborators from their posts, making an example of them in the press and in public trials. More than 210,000 Japanese were purged from public life, including 2,000 civil servants, most of whom were in the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs.12

There was simply no modern or legal precedent for MacArthur’s reforms. The changes had been made by fiat, on MacArthur’s order, and were decreed within the first months of occupation. The remains of the Japanese government, bystanders to this flurry of social reengineering, were stunned by the extent to which the occupation government subverted common Japanese understandings of class and propriety. Yet the emperor encouraged cooperation and goodwill with little direct comment on the reforms or the popular forces that were being released. This lent enormous legitimacy to the occupation and reform process with the general public. Economic restructuring emboldened workers and traditionally marginalized classes. Political liberalization, though confusing at first, empowered women, the poor, and the edges of the political spectrum. Skillful manipulation of the media, clever exploitation of latent class animosities, and the emperor’s acquiescence led to the reforms being embraced with enthusiasm. This was the sharp end of MacArthur’s
wedge strategy, and within months of the implementation of these dramatic reforms, the public began to turn against figures they perceived as being politically conservative or having betrayed them in a horrendous war.

The irony of these reforms was rich. State Department experts continued to maintain that the Japanese were incapable of democracy, aligning themselves with the conservative Japanese government, which asserted the same. As Dower notes, the “revolution” started from the top with direction and encouragement from the least transparent and most hierarchical organs in the state—the monarchy and MacArthur’s headquarters. Even though the occupation government sent out roving civic teams to educate the public about the virtues of the U.S. political system, there were no checks and balances within occupation headquarters. Moreover, Americans in Japan were at the top of a privileged caste system, exhibiting the same conceit visible in Germany. Hotels, stores, trains, buses, recreational facilities, and portions of towns were off-limits to local residents. Expression in the media and the content of curricula in schools were carefully controlled by the occupation government. And when the public began, in the occupation’s second year, to become increasingly critical of the emperor and his inaccessibility, MacArthur was quick to condemn such expression and control it.13

By late 1946, the enthusiasm of the Japanese for MacArthur’s reforms had accelerated beyond the expectations and comfort level of the occupation government. Revolution from below, necessary for real reform to be sustainable, was well under way. But after MacArthur began to censor new criticisms of the emperor and ban demonstrations, the Japanese began to understand just how limited the democracy they were coming to embrace was. The Communist Party, until then particularly enthusiastic about the reforms, began to sour on the occupation. The number of strikes increased. MacArthur moved to outlaw strikes in 1948 and more tightly control expression in the press. By 1950 and the Korean War, MacArthur had begun a purge of Communist Party members and red rhetoric from media, government, and economic institutions that rivaled the initial post-war purges of militarists. This gradual reversal puzzled, disappointed, and exasperated Japanese who had begun to constructively question the fundamental values that had led Japan to war and who were actively learning the importance of public participation and skepticism. MacArthur’s growing conservatism not only resulted in backpedaling on initial freedoms but also entailed strong encouragement from the United States for Japanese rearmament by 1950. Only the new constitution and the Japanese government’s own reluctance curbed MacArthur’s and Washington’s enthusiasm for Japanese armed participation in the Korean War.14

Vetting members of Japanese institutions was initially more challenging than in Germany. There was no equivalent to the Nazi Party to use as a litmus test of taint. In the beginning, the occupation government worked off lists of known militarists and outspoken nationalists that were prepared from intelligence gathered before the war’s end—similar to lists that have been prepared in the case of Iraq. These individuals were removed from their posts during the first weeks of the occupation, at the same time that propaganda, intelligence, military, and nationalist organizations and associations were abolished. Critical governing functions were assumed by Americans, both military and civilian, taking charge of rank-and-file Japanese left in place. A zealous citizenry and civil service completed
much of the vetting as MacArthur created division between militarists and the public. Most of the 5,700 individuals indicted for Class B and C war crimes were recommended to trial commissions by the Japanese themselves—even though no Japanese jurist sat on these courts. This raises the important question of why the opportunity to create Japanese-led trials, a powerful hedge against charges of “victor’s justice,” was not pursued even to the minimum degree it was in Germany. This is an especially important question in regard to the Tokyo Trials for Class A war criminals, criticized even by participating international justices and later by Japanese neonationalists as being little more than prejudiced revenge trials.

The role of the Japanese government throughout the occupation was nominal but important. By themselves, the Japanese government and the bureaucracy were virtually powerless. They were relevant only to the extent that MacArthur used or consulted them. The role of the existing government in essentially legitimating the decisions of the occupation government was never clearer than in the ratification of Japan’s new, postwar constitution. In March 1946, a draft constitution was handed to the Japanese prime minister by MacArthur’s aides. It was to be considered the parliament’s own work even though no Japanese had been part of its creation. In secret, MacArthur had formed a constitutional convention composed of twenty-four U.S. military officers and civilians. Only one had any significant familiarity with Japanese culture and none were experts in constitutional law. The framers were idealistic individuals from diverse backgrounds that included public administration, journalism, investment banking, and service in the U.S. Congress. MacArthur told the group to start from the three sets of basic principles he provided to create a comprehensive blueprint for Japanese governance within a week. The result was a remarkable document of political, social, and economic rights, some of which went further than the U.S. Constitution in ensuring a wide array of liberties. The draft constitution contained an equal protection clause for women and another describing the future role of a largely ceremonial emperor within a system dominated by a multiparty parliament. Significantly, Article 9 of the draft read, “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation . . . land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Members of the Japanese parliament, or Diet, were shaken by the document. They argued that the draft could not possibly work in Japanese culture. It would undermine and erode all that was essential to ordered and sustainable society. As Dower notes, only MacArthur’s threat to put the liberal document up for public referendum convinced the Diet to “own” the document and to shepherd it through symbolic passage. The Diet’s reluctance to do this illustrated a wider conservatism that made MacArthur prefer to use the bureaucracy to directly implement his decisions. For the most part, the Diet was occasionally important for the perception of self-governance and for periodic legitimation of occupation government decrees—but the bureaucracy was critical in turning decisions into meaningful action. Many of the individuals remaining in the bureaucracy and in local governments were themselves caught up in the spirit of occupation reforms. Some of the initial impetus for labor and land reform, for example, came from within the postpurge Japanese system. The reliance on an indigenous technocratic elite had its costs, however. By 1950, with the reversal of reforms well under way, the bureaucracy had assumed a less
responsive and less transparent character. Dower calls this new class of civil servants “bureaucratic mandarins,” and their dominance and eventual manipulation of policy contributed to the erosion of earlier ideals and values espoused and initially supported by occupation forces.

By the time MacArthur left Japan in 1951 and sovereignty was returned in 1952, a loss of idealism and an aimlessness characterized Japanese society, a condition that would not be overcome until the economic boom in later decades provided a new source of pride for the Japanese public. The legacy of reform remained, however. Enough of the traditional, hierarchical assumptions of Japanese society had been turned on their head to have a lasting impact: a majority now believed in the value of more equalitarian social organization and political democracy. The Japanese “read meaning” into the foreign constitution to make it a Japanese document—ignoring, for instance, provisions on women’s equality for forty years—but in the end, halting, often inconsistent postwar reform and reconstruction in Japan were a success. The role of the monarchy gracefully gave way to authentic parliamentary governance. Press freedoms evolved and endured. Large family conglomerates of finance and industrial concerns transformed into the publicly traded keiretsu that became the basis for the Japanese model envied and dissected for its secrets of success in the 1970s and 1980s. To this day, the Japanese are generally suspicious of nationalism and intolerant of militarism. With some modification, constitutional provisions outlawing war continue to guide defense policy—although this policy may be tested in coming months if North Korea triggers a regional arms race. It was an experiment in nation building, however, that would never be repeated.

The Ongoing Engagement in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s extended civil war began in 1978 and persisted for more than two decades. During that period, war and natural disasters created the single largest refugee caseload in the world for twenty straight years. An estimated 1.5 million people died, and an additional 500,000 were disabled or injured and more than 1 million Afghans were internally displaced. Particularly intense fighting beginning with the collapse of President Muhammad Najibullah’s government in 1992 led to severe deterioration of what remained of the political, social, and economic infrastructure of the country. In September 2001, fighting between the two latest combatants in the long war was still under way, with strong advances by the Taliban in the north causing rival Northern Alliance forces to retreat.

On October 7, however, U.S. airstrikes began on Taliban targets in Afghanistan, launched in response to al Qaeda attacks in Washington, D.C. and New York. By mid-December, the Taliban were in disarray and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance had occupied Kabul. Al Qaeda and most of the Taliban’s top leadership had fled the country. In the aftermath, postwar security and the formation of viable, legitimate authority in the country loomed as the two largest postintervention priorities in the region. Hastily convened talks among Afghanistan’s competing factions during December in Bonn, Germany, produced a careful, precariously balanced agreement for a transitional government and a postwar future. The bitter rivals in attendance agreed on provisions for emergency and constitutional loya jirgas, an interim power-sharing arrangement, and a schedule for new elections. Over the next 180 days, the United States would lead the coalition effort to
continue mopping-up operations in the south of the country while the United Nations would authorize an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of five thousand troops to secure Kabul. The emergency loya jirga, ending on June 19, 2002, created the current Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA). A similar jirga to draft and ratify a new Afghan constitution is to take place by December 2003 and elections for a permanent government are to be held by June 2004.15

A year and a half after intervention, the Taliban and al Qaeda are no longer able to mass and stage large-scale attacks. Humanitarian crises are fading. The Afghan government is becoming more coherent over time, and there is now slow movement to develop peace with justice in place of the sense that peace before justice was necessary. Afghans’ enthusiasm for participating in defining their future, as witnessed in the loya jirga, is clear. Several delegates, 11 percent of whom were women, went so far as to tell warlords in attendance that they should not be present. They had blood on their hands, they argued, and Afghanistan deserves better. Delegates still speak of their anger at the closed and secretive process of choosing Afghanistan’s president at the loya jirga. This outspokenness is a powerful and remarkable portent of a more hopeful future.

There is additional cause for optimism. Afghanistan has not relapsed into wholesale civil war, no small accomplishment in a country that has known little else for a generation. A pragmatic interim authority was established on schedule. Salaries of most government officials are now being paid, and cash-for-work and food-for-work programs have together created three million jobs. More than two million refugees have returned, a number far exceeding international expectations. The worst humanitarian crises have been contained with food and agricultural assistance, shelter programs, and the improvement of water sources. The rehabilitation of clinics, bazaars, schools, and veterinary centers, along with vaccination and teacher training programs, is under way. Civil liberties have improved. Training of an incipient national army has begun, and in the early months of 2003 international assistance has become more readily available for large-scale repair of roads, communications systems, university facilities, central banking, and government offices. Aid agencies have created an economy unto themselves, with the United States alone spending nearly $350 million in Afghanistan since the end of the war. Violent conflict has exhausted Afghans, and few express much sympathy for war as a useful means to achieve political ends.

But progress has also been slower than originally envisioned. The postwar peace remains profoundly vulnerable to the attention-deficit disorder of major donors, growing insecurity in the capital, military feudalism, and the rising impatience of Afghans. The international community has pledged $4.5 billion over five years for reconstruction in Afghanistan. But of the $1.8 billion promised for 2002 at the Tokyo conference in March, only $1 billion has been committed, with even less implemented as assistance in the field. The AIA has claimed that only $560 million in assistance was actually allocated in 2002, of which only $90 million has been given directly to the government to support its operations. Moreover, 80 percent of the total disbursed has funded relief programs rather than reconstruction initiatives. Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani has called this a dangerous game, one in which the reluctance and caution that international donors exercise toward the new government and reconstruction may ultimately undermine the fragile
peace. Of critical importance to stability, warn Ghani and Afghan president Hamid Karzai, will be the ability of the government in Kabul to become more relevant in the provinces by effectively delivering meaningful reconstruction assistance outside the capital.

Although the AIA is quick to blame the international community for poor performance, the administration lacks the capacity to absorb and manage large amounts of direct assistance or to coordinate the activities of its own interim ministries. Until late August 2002, to the profound frustration of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, no financial mechanism existed to channel direct assistance to AIA accounts—the Afghan Central Bank was still busy requesting fax machines, desks, and telephone lines. Moreover, only a handful of the Afghan government's twenty-nine ministers are reliable, competent partners with national, rather than regional, vision. The stubborn persistence of humanitarian emergencies in the country has necessitated an international preoccupation with relief programs, and the costs implicit in setting up large assistance operations in unfamiliar territory and in a postwar environment that lacks basic infrastructure mean less net assistance for Afghans.

Interagency and interpersonal fractiousness in the international community has also been a cause of delay. Literally hundreds of relief and reconstruction strategies exist, some neither coherent nor complementary, among various donor organizations, UN agencies, foreign governments, and international NGOs. Lines of authority and communication are ambiguous among the government's own Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), its ministries, six UN agencies, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the ISAF, the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJC-MOTF), foreign diplomatic and donor organizations, NGOs, and the new U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to be deployed in the provinces. NGOs are particularly difficult to coordinate. International NGOs, familiar with working in modern postwar environments characterized by weak, corrupt, or nonexistent governments are quick to assert their independence from oversight by the AACA and other coordination bodies. Depending on their source of funding, many organizations participate in coordination efforts to the degree that it suits their interests, and they often deploy according to internal assessments of need, cluster in areas that are easily accessible, or crowd around institutions relevant to their expertise. In the meantime, the conspicuous inequalities of wealth inherent in the operational footprints of aid organizations make Afghans impatient as they wait for the bustle of activity around them to translate into concrete improvements in their daily lives. In addition, a brain drain of overqualified Afghan talent into low-responsibility positions in international agencies continues. The government, now able to pay most of its officials the equivalent of $50 to $75 a month, complains bitterly along with local nongovernmental organizations that they cannot attract or keep good talent as Afghans can earn five to twenty-five times that amount as guards, cooks, drivers, program assistants, and managers for international agencies.

Also worrisome is the status of refugees who have gravitated to cities where inflation from the aid economy coupled with a scarcity of resources contributes to a rise in urban-rural tensions. Tribalism and more conservative Islamic notions of social and political behavior collide with the relative secularism and urban legal traditions in Afghanistan's
cities. There is also a sharpening of exclusive, regional subidentities under way that makes the development of allegiance to Kabul problematic. If this continues, the important advantages the capital may eventually offer in the rule of law, human rights protections, and economic benefits to the provinces will go unrecognized. Of additional concern is the inability of the international community to effectively contain the spread of opium poppy cultivation and the cycles of debt, coercion, and impoverishment it creates. Thus far, largely owing to the dismal failure of last year’s poppy eradication campaign, little assistance has been earmarked by any major donor for a follow-on effort in 2003.

But by far the greatest danger to Afghanistan’s stability more than a year after U.S. intervention comes from the worsening security environment. The nine thousand U.S. troops still in Afghanistan have come under increasing fire in the first four months of 2003 from hostile elements based inside Pakistan’s western border and in remote parts of Afghanistan. In Kabul, where ISAF maintains a robust presence, assassinations of government officials and an attempt on President Karzai’s life, together with explosions in the crowded streets of the city, signal the continuing insecurity of the capital. Outside Kabul, where no international peacekeeping forces are present, powerful warlords and private armies have consolidated their control over much of the rest of the country, increasing the number of human rights violations and lawlessness in the process.

Under the Taliban, the country’s endemic military factionalism was weakened. The Taliban’s demise and the United States’ continuing reliance on warlord proxies to prosecute the war now exaggerate the military feudalism that is reemerging in the postwar power vacuum. Said one U.S. official quoted in the Washington Post, “Right now, if you’re the enemy of our enemy, you’re our friend.” The simultaneous execution of a hot war using such surrogates alongside efforts to consolidate postwar peace complicates the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. The strengthening and protection of warlords such as Bacha Khan Zadran, Daoud Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Gul Agha Sherzai, and Ismail Khan to facilitate the fight against terrorism has emboldened many of the same individuals to use their newfound status to more tightly control freedom of movement, to corrupt aid activities, to curtail free expression, and to control market access in their areas.

These same commanders, many of whom hold civil posts as well, often stand accused of facilitating smuggling, participating in the poppy trade, practicing extortion, and taking part in destructive “green on green” fighting between rival militias and criminal gangs. The percentage of assistance skimmed now, say experienced aid workers, is equal to that stolen during the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. U.S. forces disregard the activity and are quick to point out that they are not in Afghanistan to police but to continue the war with al Qaeda. ISAF is of little help. It continues to be confined to Kabul, primarily because of a lack of support from the United States and a lack of will from other nations. The contributions of logistical, intelligence, air evacuation, and backup support that would make ISAF expansion viable have not materialized. With few options, Afghans must still turn to Afghan factional leaders and their irregulars for protection and favors. Some residents, particularly those in areas where corruption is rampant and where skirmishing between warlords is common, are nostalgic for the predictability of life under the Taliban.
The ideal solution is the reconstitution of the central army. But fashioning the seventy-thousand-strong institution from among the recruits currently available and at the pace at which training now proceeds will take a decade. Of the first three thousand recruits trained during 2002, nearly half deserted or returned to the employ of their regional commander. The remaining half, mostly Tajik, remain loyal to General Muhammad Qaseem Fahim, former Northern Alliance strongman and now Afghan defense minister. A contingent of new Afghan troops did take part with U.S. forces in action against antigovernment irregulars in November 2002, and fifty men of the Afghan Third Battalion now serve in Orgun, Paktika province. Both deployments are sources of great pride to Afghans and by all accounts count as successes. However, the creation of an effective, diverse, and truly national army will require a larger training program and a concerted effort to draw and retain recruits from throughout Afghanistan.17

The task of training police has proved similarly difficult and slow. While some local police remain professional, many more are notorious for their participation in extortion schemes and human rights abuses. New police-training programs in Kabul, run by the German government with additional funds from the British, have had first to weed out the worst offenders and then start from scratch with the rest. The degree of training required was evident in February 2002, when six hundred freshly trained police failed to prevent militia skirmishes in their vicinity that left two people dead and many more injured. In November 2002, police beat and then fired on unarmed students protesting living conditions at Kabul University. Four students were killed and forty were wounded. Police threatened eyewitnesses, including injured students in hospitals, warning them not to speak with reporters or the government’s nascent Afghan Human Rights Commission.

In the absence of an Afghan army, ISAF expansion, or reliable policing in coming years, few options exist to manage regional militias and other localized threats to peace and reconstruction. The United States has suggested that the deployment of eight to ten U.S.-led PRTs in key provinces over the first half of 2003 may help. Each will be commanded by a high-ranking, field-experienced U.S. military officer and consist of sixty personnel drawn from Special Forces, Civil Affairs, the United States Agency for International Development, and the State Department, as well as from other coalition representatives. But their role is to facilitate and protect civilian and military assistance providers, says the Pentagon’s Office of Stability Operations, not to interfere in factional fighting or to provide police protection to local residents. The PRTs, as part of the coalition effort fighting al Qaeda, will not be reflagged as part of ISAF or be redefined as peacekeepers. As an extension of the coalition’s presence, they will retain belligerent status in Afghanistan. Three pilot teams have been deployed thus far, one each in Bamyan, Kunduz, and Gardez.18

While acknowledging that the reorientation of the U.S. effort toward reconstruction is a step in the right direction, NGOs are nervous about the PRTs. They warn that the PRTs will have to be careful to distance themselves from these outposts since Afghans would lump any civilian humanitarians working closely with PRTs in with coalition belligerents. They also worry that PRT policy will skew assistance delivery to promote force protection, reconnaissance, critical relations with factional leaders, and “hearts-and-minds” campaigns rather than address the pressing priorities of Afghans. The restrictive security role the PRTs intend to play will confuse and disappoint Afghans. Local residents, NGOs say,
will expect more of a policing role from these outposts and will go to PRT compounds for recourse to a host of their very real security problems.

But the sharpest criticism is that the PRTs will choose the wrong interlocutors to work with or will assess and rebuild community infrastructure without the participation of local residents—something U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo have often done. The results are often high-maintenance facilities made of costly materials that cannot be maintained, given local capacities, over the long term. And as infrastructure decays from lack of maintenance, so the status of local Afghan authorities who have unilaterally identified the community’s needs is enhanced. These same figures, NGOs emphasize, are often part of the architecture of insecurity and oppression in the region and should be marginalized, not strengthened. In the end, local Afghans learn a powerful negative lesson in whose voice counts in local decision making—invariably not that of women, for example, and not that of the poor and those disconnected from the patronage networks of warlords.
In Japan and Germany, sufficient U.S. forces were on the ground to micromanage the day-to-day affairs of millions of people, and U.S. troops in both occupations harbored what John Kenneth Galbraith called “an arrogant certainty of high purpose.” Military governance in Japan was indirect, using many of the existing government institutions and much of the bureaucracy, whereas U.S. military governance in Germany was direct in the absence of German authority. Both occupation governments were thought necessary for a few months at most, but they lasted seven years. Purges took place in each location, although the purges affected far greater numbers of Germans. Dramatic showcase trials took place in both Japan and Germany, with a large number of lower-level courts trying individuals accused of lesser war crimes. Fear of communism eventually forced a reevaluation of policy in both occupations—although the outcomes of the reevaluations were different. The later, earnest focus on reconstruction in both theaters left the issues of war crimes and collective guilt unresolved, issues that remain uncomfortable in Japan and Germany to this day. The majority opinion of experts was that both populations were incapable of understanding or practicing democracy. Moreover, cultural decontamination was thought to be necessary in the early months of occupation to exercise both populations of the demons and militarism that had brought them to war.

But the similarities end there. Whereas the United States was firmly in control of the whole of postwar Japan, it controlled only one of four sectors in Germany. Japan surrendered before invasion became necessary, leaving much of the infrastructure of the country intact, unlike in Germany. The figure of the Japanese emperor was essential to legitimizing postwar policies and maintaining critical continuity during the occupation. There was no equivalent of the emperor in Germany. In Japan there was no policy calling for punishment of a population perceived to be collectively responsible for the war. Moreover, occupying forces in Japan were influenced by an ethnocentric “missionary zeal” to bring truth to a people once described as “monkeys” and “baboons” in wartime propaganda. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, had more of a free hand in developing policy than Clay ever enjoyed, given the “Europe first” orientation that prevailed in Washington until the outbreak of the Korean War. Dower describes how the Japanese embraced MacArthur as their own and how the messianic, paternalistic, and charismatic viceroy was virtually untouchable as he carried out his mandate from his Tokyo compound. Clay, by character and by place, never achieved such an elevated status and often suffered as the whipping boy for Washington’s failed manipulation of early postwar policy in Germany.
Afghanistan, at the outside edge of the eighteen-month window of vulnerability when postwar peace most often fails, remains precarious. The country is not quite at peace and not quite at war and is in danger of losing its balance without continued and intelligent international support. The United States shows continued reluctance to commit adequate resources to close the enduring security gap that contributes to social, political, and economic instability. The ordinary continues to be extraordinary in Afghanistan. Only eleven of twenty-three regional government offices are now connected by phone. No formal banking system exists. A nationwide radio broadcast network has only recently been completed and the road system is so degraded that it takes hours to travel to destinations that required a fraction of the time years ago. Kabul, where utility services are the most reliable, suffers regular disruptions in electrical service, and water sources in the city continue to be vulnerable to the persistent drought. As Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani puts it, Afghanistan has gone backward in time during an age of acceleration. Often in postwar environments it is not what is accomplished in what amount of time that is important but an impression that things are getting better. Nation building is not merely a physical process but also a psychological one. Maintaining modest momentum in postwar reconstruction and ensuring that Afghans take part and know what is occurring and what to expect in the future will be fundamental to success in the coming years. The dangers of instability and an upsurge in violence are real, and making progress on several fronts over the remainder of 2003 will be critical to successful postwar reconstruction.

There are limits to the significance of the lessons learned in Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan to the U.S. military occupation of Iraq. The three cases were products of their time and specific sets of circumstances and personalities. Nonetheless, these U.S. encounters with complete military occupation (in Japan and Germany) and limited, proxy engagement (in Afghanistan) do have lessons relevant to the current age of nation building and preemptive war, lessons that may prove critical to winning postwar peace.

- Demonstrate a peace dividend. Showing U.S. commitment to rebuild and reform the country with little delay had benefits in Japan. The lack of such commitment contributed to bitterness and war nostalgia in Germany. The longevity of German postwar resistance groups like the Werewolves is partly attributable to the prolonged desperation of the German public under JCS 1067. In Japan, the success of General MacArthur’s wedge politics depended on making good on a number of astonishing promises to liberalize the defeated nation early. In Afghanistan, insecurity will prevail and impatience will rise if the international presence does not soon translate into observable improvements in the quality of life for a significant number of Afghans.

- Reject notions of collective guilt. The rejection of collective guilt in occupied Japan was important in rapidly building momentum for reform from below. The focus on collective punishment and reparations that preoccupied Clay’s government in Germany complicated reforms even after the Marshall Plan began. MacArthur was fond of saying that to allow the Japanese to reassure themselves of their new identity and of a better future, it was necessary to make the militarist cross section of Japanese society the vessel of all that was bad and backward in the nation. Rejection of
collective guilt in Japan also made the emperor’s cooperation possible. Developing a strong sense of Afghan identity apart from military and regional factionalism is likewise important to the success of postwar transition in Afghanistan.

Commit to transition rather than to half measures. The United States stepped into the moral and physical wreckage of Germany and Japan to assume complete control. Planning for each occupation had begun more than two years before the war’s end, and the United States was prepared for a wide variety of eventualities. Managing the restoration of the rule of law, institutions of governance, utility services, transportation networks, and market access along with distributing food rations and providing shelter and health care to stave off humanitarian and political crises were the top priorities. In Afghanistan, a lack of sufficient security and of robust international management of the postwar environment undermine the peace process. Many Afghans are disillusioned by the disconnect between the rhetoric committing the international community to peacebuilding and the unwillingness to directly address the serious threats factional leaders and poor infrastructure pose to stability and human rights.

Take the time to win a just peace. Despite years of planning before the end of World War II, the United States still underestimated the amount of time that would be required for the complex tasks of rebuilding infrastructure, vetting officials, restructuring institutions, and transforming citizens’ relationship to their government in Germany and Japan. To the credit of the United States, it stayed on to finish the job it started, well beyond the six to eighteen months originally envisioned. A similar tendency to underestimate the time required to win peace has been evident more recently in Bosnia, where the seven-year U.S. peacekeeping presence in Bosnia was initially conceived of as a temporary intervention lasting no longer than six months. Other engagements, past and present, ranging from peacekeeping to full occupation, in Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo, likewise testify to the failure to recognize that postwar reconstruction takes a good deal of time. This mistake is a constant in the calculus of postwar planning throughout U.S. history.

Reform, assist, and collaborate with local institutions. In Germany and Japan, U.S. occupation governments realized that while they could physically secure the environment more or less on their own, they needed indigenous institutions to begin the process of deeper social and political reform essential to the eventual downsizing of the occupation. In each case, this transfer of responsibility was possible only after indigenous institutions, including police, courts, legal codes, ministries, and local governments, were reorganized for a peace economy and individuals were vetted for their complicity in the war effort. The Afghan government in Kabul exercises de jure but not de facto power. With a greater capacity to deliver goods and services, Kabul may be responsive enough to make progress on human rights, reconstruction, coordination, media development, and rule of law. But to create a viable republic, Kabul must offer Afghan citizens a clear agenda, hope, and tangible benefits. Building the capacity and depth of important ministries while facilitating their reliable delivery
of assistance, and passing funds through their good offices if necessary, will be critical to a return to normalcy in Afghanistan.

- Encourage an ethic of public participation to sustain democratic development. An important element of MacArthur’s wedge strategy was to work locally among outlying communities, completely bypassing the conservative top and middle layers of Japanese government. Thus, for instance, local elections were held in which women voted for the first time and roving teams of civics instructors were dispatched to communities to discuss the nature of democracy (albeit all too often to describe the superiority of U.S.-style governance). Some of these teams were followed by civic affairs officers who then organized communities to begin reconstruction projects in those locations. It was democracy in miniature and it helped communities address their real needs while developing an appreciation for political participation that proved useful after the return of sovereignty. As democratic governance emerged in Japan, programs such as these encouraged a critical mass of citizens to take part in elections and to engage in political discourse while making demands and articulating interests to a new government in ways that sustained reformed institutions. The same began to occur in Germany, but only after the Marshall Plan was implemented. Even then, the Marshall Plan was top-heavy and funded reconstruction of government and economic institutions at the expense of encouraging local participation in the rehabilitation of community infrastructure. The loya jirga process in Afghanistan, as rushed and imperfect as it was, remains admirable for the way it emboldened Afghans to speak out against factional violence and initiated national dialogue on the country’s future. The lack of follow-on opportunities for Afghans to capitalize on this political moment, the continuance of factional violence, the closed and secretive constitutional loya jirga process, and the slow progress of forming inclusive political parties to compete in coming elections may erode this impressive initial momentum.

- Avoid displaying arrogance of purpose and creating caste systems, which foster cynicism and disillusionment. A disconnect between reform initiatives and the condescension of occupation institutions made U.S. intentions suspect and undermined the credibility of military governments in Germany and Japan. Fortunately for the U.S. authorities, the fear of Soviet influence and of the more thorough and punishing purges conducted in the Soviet sector muted German criticism of U.S. arrogance. The emperor’s support and MacArthur’s flamboyance and determination to make rapid changes in Japan tempered the impact of such dissonance there. But without such intervening variables, it is likely that the two-class system would have critically undermined the legitimacy of each occupation authority. These problems are less pronounced in Afghanistan, although heavily armed U.S. intelligence operatives and combat troops have engendered ill will with occasional callous disregard for local customs and their comport.

- Achieve international legitimacy and deal with factionalism. The occupations of Japan and Germany and the war in Afghanistan had a high degree of international legitimacy and could afford some disharmony between appearance and action. War
between the Allies, on the one side, and Germany and Japan, on the other, was a fight between equals, and the surrenders were unconditional, lending a degree of internal legitimacy that was important to establishing a workable occupation government. The war in Afghanistan took place in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. A large “coalition of the willing” was easily formed to force the Taliban from power and evict al Qaeda from their traditional Afghan bases. Neither Japan nor Germany was marked by ethnic or religious fractures, and neither was vulnerable to postwar destabilization from ethnic or religious minorities. Postwar borders were relatively sound, and there was no equivalent to tribalism in either instance that would threaten to break the postwar nation apart once the power of the previous regime was broken. In this regard, Japan and Germany were free from much of the corrosive ethnic and regional factionalism that impairs the peace process in Afghanistan and that may prove difficult to deal with in Iraq.

- Understand that actions may have unintended consequences. MacArthur’s heavy reliance on the Japanese bureaucracy to directly implement his initiatives resulted in a powerful and manipulative institution that was not politically accountable to voters. Even after political reforms and vetting, civil servants were often the target of corruption charges, and once the occupation ended, the bureaucracy was a significant impediment to further political development. Another example of actions with unintended political impact is how representatives eager to find local interlocutors who could speak English or provide valuable technical information initially enhanced the status of certain Japanese and German individuals, later found to be criminals. Similarly, the eventual rehabilitation of discredited individuals in both occupations—in Germany under JCS 1779 and in Japan in response to the Korean War—had a negative impact on citizens’ ability to contend with their nation’s violent past. In Afghanistan, the most egregious example of unintended or powerful negative consequences flowing from a course of action can be found in the courting of warlord proxies to conduct the ongoing hot war against remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

- Make use of social capital to temper the timing and character of transitions. In Germany and Japan, initiatives by occupation governments were necessary to catalyze popular support for postwar rehabilitation. Neither Japan nor Germany had a Nelson Mandela or Aung San Suu Kyi who could mobilize citizens to take matters of democratic reform and transition into their own hands. The spark for transformation, especially in Japan, was external and implemented in such a way as to encourage change from below. The conservatism of the Japanese government under occupation and of U.S. experts on Japan and Germany who said each population was incapable of democracy was misplaced. In Afghanistan, public patience is waning with the Kabul government, but goodwill toward Karzai and many of his ministers remains intact. However, Afghanistan has precious little in the way of deep social capital to contribute to reconstruction and transformative political reform.

- Minimize the effect of external political events, which can undercut the best-laid plans. Ironically, Germany’s division resulted not from the ambitions of internal separatists
but from dissension among the Allies and the Cold War. The Korean War forced a significant revision of occupation policy in Japan. Both Germany and Japan demonstrate how internal occupation initiatives were vulnerable to course-correction pressures that were not always due to any challenges or opportunities within the postwar environment. Afghanistan illustrates the importance of assurances that the United States is willing to go the distance. If there is consensus on anything in Kabul it is that the U.S. presence is vital to the maintenance of stability in the country. Afghans and aid workers alike worry that the situation in Iraq could distract U.S. resources and attention away from Afghanistan.
The Road Ahead in Iraq: Nation Building and Postwar Peace

Writing in response to the revised “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” made public in September 2002, John Ikenberry describes the country’s new foreign policy as a vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using forces and meting out justice. It is a vision in which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more conditional for countries that challenge Washington’s standards of internal and external behavior.23

“It is a vision,” Ikenberry adds, “made necessary—at least in the eyes of its advocates—by the new apocalyptic character of contemporary terrorist threats and by America’s unprecedented global dominance.” Michael McFaul of the Carnegie Endowment and the Hoover Institution finds the National Security Strategy remarkable for the way it “makes promotion of liberty around the world an explicit U.S. national security interest.” Charles Krauthammer finds reason for optimism in this “unilateral moment,” contending that “we are not just any hegemon. We run a uniquely benign imperium.” The neconservative nonprofit organization Project for the New American Century, whose supporters include Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz, maintains that the extraordinary and unparalleled power of the United States is best used “preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.” President George W. Bush, speaking before the graduating class of 2002 at West Point, reminded those in attendance that “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress.” And lest it be forgotten, he argued, “the peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation.”24

How the United States strikes the balance between the high value it puts on stability and its rhetoric of liberation in postwar Iraq will be closely watched. Each move the United States makes will reveal its post-9/11 international persona and reflect how the international community will read Washington’s future intentions. The war and the peace, executed poorly, says Ikenberry, could “trigger antagonism and resistance that will leave America in a more hostile and divided world.”25

The United States has the military dominance to succeed at war, but does it have what it takes to engage in nation building for the decade or more it may take to set Iraq on an orderly, stable path to democracy?

Simon Chesterman maintains that the United States does not. In Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the United States has backed into such responsibilities, often with deep denial and reluctance, resulting in a lack of commitment when the going gets tough. He writes:
The importance of domestic politics in the exercise of American power means that it has an exceptionally short attention span—far shorter than is needed to complete the long and complicated task of rebuilding a country that has seen over two decades of war, sanctions, and oppression under brutal leaders.26

“This describes both Afghanistan and Iraq,” adds Chesterman. Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper of the Carnegie Endowment note that the United States replaced eighteen regimes by force in the last century, but democratic rule prevailed in only Germany, Japan, Italy, Panama, and Grenada—a success rate of 30 percent. Iraq, Pei and Kasper say, is the last place the United States should continue the practices that account for such a poor performance. Tom Carothers agrees. Carothers, a democratization expert at Carnegie, stresses that the complexity, profile, and sensitivity of an Iraq intervention will require the United States “to commit itself to a massive, expensive, demanding, and long-lasting reconstruction effort.”27

The responsibilities and risks ahead in the postwar period in Iraq are daunting. Examples of what the United States may face are found in the post–World War II occupations of Germany and Japan described earlier. Afghanistan is an example of Washington’s new projection of power, exposing the modern challenges of postconflict reconstruction and the complex relationship the United States continues to have with nation building. The lessons from these interventions for would-be nation builders in Iraq are clear.

1. In the immediate postwar period, security and rule of law are essential to the success of humanitarian and reconstruction initiatives as well as political reform. It is not sufficient to separate and contain warring factions—security that counts also requires a constabulary capacity, civilian policing, and the ability to arrest, detain, and try offenders in a fair manner. Quick action in Germany and Japan proved critical to establishing effective public order in those occupations. Retrospective assessments of intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo note the damage a lack of early and effective means of transitional justice and postconflict security had in implementing reforms there. A continuing lack of postconflict security in Afghanistan threatens to undermine eighteen months of hard-won achievements in that country.

2. Recognize the political implications of each decision, minimize arrogance, and avoid the establishment of a postwar caste system. The arrogance of privilege and absolute control that Utley chronicled in Germany and the liberties Americans took with their status in Japan demonstrate that it may be difficult for U.S. forces to occupy Iraq without hubris— but it is essential that the United States make the effort. The attitudes of superiority evident in Germany and Japan will prove disastrous in Iraq, where every move will carry political significance and where international legitimacy for occupation is in short supply. A caste system, as subtle and informal as it may be, will be too iconographic of a demonized United States as well as antithetical to democratization rhetoric and nation-building initiatives. In general, the United States and its representatives must be cautious about who is chosen as an interlocutor, who receives rent for facilities, how occupation staff encourage public participation and political representation in an ethnically charged environment, and whether appropriate proxies have been picked to carry out governance and security func-
tions. Occupation forces, civilian and military, down to the eighteen-year-old sentry at the sharp end of Washington’s diplomacy, must be on their best behavior.

3. Employ “wedge” tactics, similar to those used by MacArthur in Japan to isolate the criminals from the rest of the population. As Fouad Ajami has observed, there is an acute sense of betrayed promise in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athists are widely regarded as criminals. Regarding all Iraqis as collectively guilty of the regime’s crimes not only would be inappropriate but also would confirm suspicions of U.S. ethnocentrism and imperial ambition. The United States should instead expand civil liberties, promote public participation in political decision making and community affairs, and purge Ba’athists from high-ranking civil and military positions. Such an approach will help to make popular forces less likely to undermine assistance initiatives and more likely to embrace reconstruction and to recognize that reform will be a long-term process.

4. Create near-term participatory “peace dividend” reconstruction initiatives; these will prove beneficial in managing rising expectations, avoiding dependency, and drawing public support away from possible spoilers. In Germany, prolonged resistance to, disillusionment with, and a lack of progress on deeper reforms was due in great part to the early unavailability of reconstruction assistance. In Japan, MacArthur’s rapid delivery on a number of dramatic promises was important to the success of his political strategy. In Afghanistan, the delay in implementing significant political reform and reconstruction assistance is eroding Afghan patience and support for the international presence. In Iraq, large, highly visible projects to repair transportation, water, health, and telecommunications systems will certainly be necessary; however, the United States must also not neglect the contributions that can be made by Iraq’s social capital (its indigenous capacities) not only to large-scale projects but also to smaller, community-based relief and reconstruction endeavors. Local projects do not have to be expensive—most would average $25,000 to $50,000—but these funds could be channeled directly into communities once local citizens have been organized to prioritize their reconstruction requests. The opportunity to invigorate a democratic ethic in this fashion merits strong consideration. A broad campaign of such projects using a participatory methodology would be an important precursor to local elections and civil society development. In Kosovo such projects were useful in developing a new political class and a renewed sense of citizen efficacy. A planned “National Solidarity Program” in Afghanistan promises the same.

5. During the very first weeks of postconflict operations establish clear policies for civil-military interaction on relief and development initiatives. The distribution of humanitarian aid and the implementation of quick-impact reconstruction projects will occur simultaneously during the first weeks of postconflict operations. Such tasks call for significant civil-military interaction, which in turn requires clear policies to ensure that U.S. military contingents and nongovernmental organizations understand other’s role and can collaborate effectively. Too often, policies are unclear or fashioned on the spot, creating confusion and mutual hostility between the military and the NGOs. If the military and NGOs, as well as the Iraqi people, are not to lose
valuable time and important opportunities, guidelines for civil-military interaction must be clearly established early on—not on the run, as is the case with the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Will the U.S. military engage in aid distribution and reconstruction projects only as a last resort? Or will it take the lead in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance? Ideally, the military should use its expertise to establish security, open aid corridors, facilitate logistics, and supply civilian implementers with information on dangers ranging from mines to spoilers. The military is likely to facilitate distribution of humanitarian aid and reconstruction with its engineering and civil affairs expertise only to the extent that international and local civilian agencies are unable to do the job. This emphasis on civilian organizations will work only if they are sufficiently funded and fully informed about the operational environment by the military as postwar operations are under way.

6. Form advisory bodies composed of Iraqis not associated with the past regime at the earliest possible moment. These bodies should be succeeded by a variety of supervised participatory selection processes at local and regional levels to choose delegates to a new Iraqi transitional council—a council that will be advisory in its first months but will slowly assume greater responsibility. Unlike in Afghanistan, military or factional leaders should be precluded from participating or holding any civil office. As in Japan and Germany, these local bodies should be composed of vetted individuals. One of the first responsibilities of this advisory entity in Iraq, together with occupation coordinators, will be to develop a plan for the form of the later, sovereign government. The advisory council and its subcommittees should also work with occupation coordinators to prepare for eventual elections, schedule legal and constitutional reform, plan for community-based democratization initiatives, and identify Iraqi government capacities that need attention and assistance in the first eight months of occupation.

7. Do not underestimate the needs, challenges, and time required for postconflict reconstruction and nation building. The United States should brace for a long-term commitment—perhaps even longer than the initial phases of the Japanese and German occupations. The anticipated six-month commitment currently being described by Pentagon planners will likely be too short a period to consolidate the most volatile threats to the peace process and to return significant governing authority to Iraq, where there is no rule of law, no political party structure to build on, no separation of powers, and no democratic tradition. Moreover, near-term fulfillment of the significant responsibilities of transitional occupation will be possible only if significant numbers of Iraqis are retained in their civil service posts and if the United States actively promotes democratic political development through advisory councils and by working with government structures once they are purged of Saddam Hussein’s appointees. This process should not be rushed. The United States must be opportunistic and swift in its response to political and humanitarian crises and to any eruption of violence, malfeasance, or high crime—while reassuring to Iraqis that it
will stay the course. If the occupation government can conduct itself in this fashion, it may well enjoy the patience and indulgence of Iraq’s people.

8. Ensure the prompt and thorough political decontamination and de-Ba’athification of Iraq. In Germany, nearly all members of the Nazi Party were dismissed from their civil and military posts within six months of the start of the U.S. occupation. In Japan, militarists identified by the Allies before the war’s end were purged in the first ten weeks. Occupation forces and local Japanese inspired by MacArthur’s wedge tactics identified and removed remaining militarists within eight months. In Haiti, large numbers of the police were removed from their posts in the first months after U.S. action there.

In Iraq, the treatment of the army will be very important. The army is perhaps the single most potent and legitimate symbol of statehood in the country and should not be humiliated. After the Iraqi army is confined to barracks to initially vet and purge objectionable individuals, Iraqi brigades should be given incremental responsibility to assist with constabulary duties, contain spoilers, and facilitate aid delivery. Iraq’s armed forces—not regional factional leaders as in Afghanistan—should serve as U.S. proxies in Iraq where needed.

Success in postwar Iraq will be at least as difficult to accomplish than winning the peace in Germany and Japan proved to be—and it will be a far more intricate task than the limited U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the United States will be held to unfamiliar standards in complicated circumstances. Is the United States ready?

The United States has the talent, resources, experience, and know-how to succeed in rebuilding Iraq. But the United States must summon the will to overcome a congenital aversion to nation building and a new penchant for unilateralism if the odds are to favor stable, pluralistic peace in Iraq. If violence and disorder persist within postwar Iraq on the U.S. watch, the consequences for the larger post-9/11 security and democratization agenda may be ruinous—especially if the United States puts in place an unpopular, unrepresentative government, rapidly exits what may become a morass, or finds itself without allies amid a sullen, anti-American population bent on evicting an occupying army. The United States has fundamentally reshaped its doctrine of military engagement without similarly reforming its commitment and capacity to stabilize and transform postconflict environments. It is this dissonance between an overdeveloped ability to wage and win war and an anemic facility for winning peace that may be the undoing not only of populations distressed by preemptive war but also of U.S. ambitions to reshape the norms of international order and the U.S. role in the world.

Losing the peace in Iraq could endanger the security of the United States, its international image, and its reputation for years to come. The practical manner in which the United States might leverage its unprecedented power in the future will likewise be profoundly influenced by the outcome of the peace. The United States must carefully consider what it takes to get the job done, brace to contend with the unexpected, and go the distance in postconflict Iraq, mindful of its successes and failures in such endeavors in the past.

2. Directive to Commander in Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany: April 1945 (Joints Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067). The directive grew out of what came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan, named after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who advocated strict rules to punish and pacify the Germans under the premise of collective guilt and to ensure that the nation would never again militarize to threaten Europe or the United States.


6. “It is moreover inevitable that many Americans should be demoralized by their privileged status in Germany. You can’t put most young men in a position to disregard law, conscience, and training without spoiling them.” Ibid., 242.

7. Only in 1948, a year after the punitive JCS 1067 was replaced with the Marshall Plan (JCS 1779), did U.S. military personnel such as Lieutenant A. D. Porter note that the tenor of indoctrination instruction for incoming soldiers had changed. Instructors admonished newcomers: “We've been kicking the Germans around for three years. It is now time to treat them like men. You shouldn’t say ‘Fritz’ or ‘you damned Kraut,’ but address them as ‘Mister’ and remember they are persons like yourself whose human dignity should be respected.” See ibid., 248. This behavior is reminiscent of events in Kosovo under the UN protectorate there. One UN international staff member serving as a municipal administrator compared himself to Jesus when asked by local residents about his role and authority.

8. For mention of a Ministry for Political Liberation, see Roy Licklider, “The American Way of State Building: Germany, Japan, Somalia, and Panama,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 10, no. 3 (winter 1999): 87. Regarding denazification, vetting of eligible government officials, police, and judges hinged almost exclusively on whether they were members of the Nazi Party. Evidence of a criminal record also played a role. Experience and skill were not a priority. This reversed after the implementation of JCS 1779. Several important Nazi Party members were rehabilitated for a variety of high-level posts.

9. Refugee crises involving Germans expelled from Pomerania and Silesia were also a serious challenge to Clay’s ability to provide sufficient assistance to Germans in his sector. See Beschloss, The Conquerors, 273–275.
Interestingly, Beschloss notes that surveys completed in Germany in 1955 indicate an absence of guilt among Germans. Most Germans surveyed thought that the prewar period was the best time in recent history and that Hitler and the Nazis simply executed their good ideas poorly. See ibid., 279.


13. MacArthur was careful to protect the emperor and his reputation—especially from the close scrutiny of the Tokyo Trials prosecutors.

14. For a description of the occupation government’s backpedaling, or “reverse course,” see Dower, Embracing Defeat, 525. Fear of communism and the advent of the Korean War marked dramatic reversals in civil liberties, and popular disillusionment accompanied related moves to reconstitute the dismantled finance and business conglomerates to help in the war effort in Korea. As in Germany, a substantial number of dishonored individuals purged as militarists and wartime financiers were rehabilitated to assist in reconstructing the economy.

15. Notably absent at Bonn were representatives of Afghan civil society. Those who participated in the tightly controlled secret talks were from the factions that had battled one another throughout the Afghan war.


18. These teams were originally referred to as Joint Reconstruction Teams, or JRTs. The Afghan government requested the name change. During a pilot phase, scheduled to last through June 2003, the name will remain “Provisional Reconstruction Teams.” After that time, the teams will be referred to as “Provincial Reconstruction Teams.”

19. Galbraith was referring to persons like himself who were economic planners managing the U.S. war economy. See John Kenneth Galbraith, Journey through Economic Time: A Firsthand View (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994); and Dower, Embracing Defeat, 73.

20. See Dower, Embracing Defeat, 213.

21. Ibid., 73–74. MacArthur would eventually be disowned by the Japanese in a dramatic and rapid reversal of affections after the general compared the Japanese people to a “boy of twelve” in a speech he gave before the U.S. Senate on May 5, 1951. For an account of the Japanese reaction to the speech, see ibid., 551.

22. Compare Serbia, where a sense of persecution, exacerbated by manipulative politicians, continues to make recognition of wartime excesses and responsibility problematic. Perhaps an important lost opportunity was the chance to try Slobodan Milosevic first at home, in Serbian courts, on charges of corruption and for other crimes that drained his country of revenue, resources, and hope. After Milosevic was demystified with exposure as a common criminal, he could have then been sent to The Hague.

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage, and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.


25. Coincidentally, nearly one hundred years ago at Versailles, where the British and French prepared to carve Iraq from the Ottoman Empire, President Woodrow Wilson affirmed his intentions to commit the United States to “make the world safe for democracy” in an imperial vision unmatched until recently. Also see Michael Ignatieff, “The Burden,” New York Times Magazine, January 5, 2003. For background on how the power of symbolism and the portrayal of identity make demands on others to treat the actor accordingly, see the classic that launched a sociological school of thought: Irving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959). Thomas Friedman writes of the “right makes right ethic” in the Middle East in chapter 4 of From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor Books, 1995).


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